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California Environmental Quality Act Lawsuits and
California’s Housing Crisis
Jennifer Hernandez
Summary
The California Environmental Quality Act (“CEQA”)1 continues to play a
vital role in assuring that our state and local agencies carefully evaluate,
disclose, and avoid or reduce the potentially adverse environmental
consequences of their actions. In addition, CEQA ensures that agencies
consider and respond to public and agency comments on these
environmental issues, and accept the responsibility of disclosing when, even
after mitigating adverse impacts, such actions would have significant
unavoidable adverse impacts on the environment.
However, in recent years most CEQA lawsuits filed in California seek to
block infill housing and transit-oriented land use plans, as well as public
service and infrastructure projects in existing California communities. Most
of the challenged projects are precisely the types of projects and plans that
today’s environmental and climate policies seek to promote. The most
frequent targets of CEQA lawsuits typically are required to undergo a
rigorous environmental analysis and public review process that takes 18 to
36 months or longer. This process involves an Environmental Impact Report
and at least three rounds of public notice and comment before being
eligible for approval by public votes of elected officials. Projects without the
ample economic resources required to pay all costs (including technical and
legal experts) are never eligible for an approval, and thus cannot be sued
under CEQA. Even the types of infill projects most commonly sued under
CEQA that are not ultimately sued must undergo three rounds of costly

 Jennifer Hernandez practices environmental and land use law in the
San Francisco and Los Angeles offices of Holland & Knight. Many other
members of Holland & Knight contributed to the study of CEQA lawsuits
evaluated in this article, including Elizabeth Lake, Tamsen Plume, Amanda
Monchamp, Nicholas Targ, Charles Coleman, David Preiss, Susan Booth,
Bradley Brownlow, Tara Kaushik, Chelsea Maclean, Paula Kirlin, Joanna
Meldrum, Dan Golub, Stephanie DeHerrera, Rob Taboada, Genna Yarkin,
Rachel Boyce, Abigail Alter, and Haley Nieh.
1. Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 21000 (West 2016).
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administrative proceedings: (1) local agency staff, (2) appointed planning
commissions, and (3) elected city councils or boards of supervisors;
planning commission and elected council or board approvals require
majority votes from officials who are themselves elected and appointed
based on majority votes from elections. CEQA lawsuits may only be filed
against the projects that survive this multi-tiered review and approval
gauntlet, and are actually approved. There is no data available on the
projects that lack the financial resources or the ability to overcome staff or
political resistance to complete the entirety of this process, and are thus
abandoned or downsized to avoid a CEQA lawsuit, or else, they enter into
financial and other settlements to avoid a CEQA lawsuit.
In 2015, I joined with two law firm colleagues and published In the
Name of the Environment, which was the first comprehensive study of all
lawsuits filed statewide under the California Environmental Quality Act.2
This study reviewed all lawsuits filed over a three-year study period between
2010 and 2012 (“First Dataset”). Our study recommended a “mend, not end”
approach to updating CEQA by modifying CEQA lawsuit rules to assure that
enforcement of CEQA is again aimed at protecting the environment and
public health. We found that too often enforcement of CEQA is aimed at
promoting the economic agendas of competitors and labor union leaders, or
the discriminatory “Not In My Backyard” (NIMBY) agendas of those seeking
to exclude housing, park, and school projects that would diversify
communities by serving members of other races and economic classes. We
did not suggest any new CEQA exemptions or otherwise “gutting” CEQA or
any other environmental, public health, or climate laws or regulations. We
made three specific recommendations for amending CEQA’s litigation rules:
First, anonymous CEQA lawsuits by parties seeking to conceal their
identity and their economic interests in the outcome of lawsuits must end.
CEQA’s purpose is to protect the environment and human health, not
advance economic agendas.
Second, duplicative CEQA lawsuits allowing twenty or more lawsuit
challenges for each agency approval for the same project or plan must end.
Our communities have and must continue to evolve to meet new
environmental, equity, and economic needs without the delays and costs
created by serial lawsuits filed over many years (and even multiple decades)
that repeatedly attack the same plans and projects.

2. Stephanie M. DeHerrera, David Friedman, Jennifer L. Hernandez, In
the Name of the Environment: Litigation Abuse Under CEQA, HOLLAND & KNIGHT
(August 2015), https://perma.cc/SV3V-F5L2. To compile the original report
as well as this sequel, we filed a Public Records Act request with the
Attorney General’s office, which by statute is required to be served with
copies of all CEQA lawsuits filed statewide. See FN 4 in this first report for
the lawsuit petition collection methodology.
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Finally, we supported expanding “remedy relief” beyond politically
favored projects in “transactional” bills that addressed only one or two
projects, and instead more broadly limiting the extraordinary judicial
remedy of vacating project approvals if a CEQA study is deficient to projects
that could actually cause harm to the natural environment or public health.
The presumptive remedy for deficient CEQA studies for other projects
should be the required correction of CEQA study and imposition of
additional feasible mitigation if warranted by the corrected study.
Our study has garnered significant support, and some criticism. No
critics found any error in our data. Several commenters asserted that there
was not enough CEQA litigation to warrant making any conclusion about the
need for modifying CEQA’s litigation rules. Notwithstanding efforts to
dismiss the need to update CEQA’s litigation rules, the political reality is
that both before and after publication of our study, several “billionaire”
projects, such as professional sports arenas and office headquarter
complexes, have sought—and many have received—legislative relief from
CEQA’s standard litigation framework.
This article presents the next three-year tranche of CEQA lawsuit data
(2013-2015) (“Second Dataset”). The pattern of CEQA lawsuits has not
changed, although an even higher percentage of CEQA lawsuit challenges
were aimed at projects within existing communities. The top lawsuit targets
remain infill housing and local land use plans to increase housing densities
and promote transit. Given California’s extraordinary housing crisis3 and the
shame inherent in having the nation’s highest poverty rate in one of the
world’s most successful economies,4 the Second Dataset demonstrates even
more clearly the need to update CEQA’s litigation rules to bring
enforcement of CEQA into alignment with the state’s environmental, equity,
and economic priorities.

I.

Introduction

The First Dataset, the 2015 study I coauthored, demonstrated that
CEQA lawsuits were most often aimed at infill housing (especially multifamily apartments in urbanized areas), that more transit projects were
challenged than roadway and highway projects combined, and that the most
frequent “industrial” targets challenged were clean energy facilities like solar
and wind projects. As we discussed in our first report, these are the

3. LAO
Housing
Publications,
LEGISLATIVE
ANALYST’S
OFFICE,
https://perma.cc/6F87-7NXW.
4. David Friedman, Jennifer Hernandez, California's Social Priorities,
HOLLAND
&
KNIGHT,
Chapman
University
Press
(2015),
https://perma.cc/XKB7-4YK4.
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categories of projects—infill housing, transit, and renewable energy—
viewed as environmentally beneficial, and each is a critical element of
California’s climate policies.5 The First Dataset helped break through
political rhetoric about what was—and wasn’t—being targeted by CEQA
lawsuits. Most importantly, the data showed that the litigation practice that
has evolved since CEQA’s 1970 enactment date was no longer focused on
protecting forests and other natural lands, or fighting pollution sources like
factories and freeways. Rather, CEQA has evolved into a legal tool most
often used against the higher density urban housing, transit, and renewable
energy projects, which are all critical components of California’s climate
priorities and California’s ongoing efforts to remain a global leader on
climate policy.
The First Dataset also demonstrated the widespread abuse of CEQA
lawsuits for nonenvironmental purposes. State and regional environmental
advocacy groups like the Sierra Club brought only thirteen precent of these
lawsuits, while newlyminted, unincorporated groups with environmentalsounding names filed nearly half to the most CEQA lawsuits. Unlike the
federal environmental laws that allow for “citizen suit” enforcement like the
Clean Water Act, Clean Air Act, and Endangered Species Act, CEQA lawsuits
can be filed anonymously. Additionally, lawsuits can be filed by parties
attempting to advance an economic rather than environmental agenda, such
as business competitors, labor unions, and “bounty hunter” lawyers seeking
quick cash settlements, even if they have no real client.
This article compiles and analyzes the next three years of statewide
CEQA lawsuits, which extend into California’s post-recession economic
recovery period between 2013-2015. We repeated our original study
methodology, but also sorted the data into regional subsets to better
understand how CEQA lawsuit patterns differ by region. We also mapped
CEQA lawsuit challenges in the six-county Los Angeles region, which is the
state’s most populous and most CEQA litigious region.
This article also provides more detail on CEQA lawsuits challenging
projects to build more housing, given the severity of California’s housing
crisis. Nonpartisan agencies6 and outside experts7 have attributed this crisis
to about three decades of severe underproduction of new housing,
especially in the coastal employment centers of the Bay Area and Southern
California. The housing crisis has produced a cascading sequence of

5. See, e.g., California Air Resource Board Scoping Plans for achieving
greenhouse gas reduction targets, available here: AB 32 Scoping Plan,
CALIFORNIA AIR RESOURCES BOARD (July 14, 2017), https://perma.cc/B9TH-9R6Y.
6. LAO, supra note 2.
7. Jan Mischke, Shannon Peloquin, Daniel Weisfield, Jonathan
Woetzel, Closing California's Housing Gap, MCKINSEY & COMPANY (Oct. 2016),
https://perma.cc/QG7Q-U74E.
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adverse consequences to working Californians. These consequences include
the highest poverty rate in the nation when housing costs are taken into
account, extreme commutes of more than three hours per day, billions of
dollars in lost economic productivity, and adverse personal and public
health outcomes including homelessness (more than 40,000 in Los Angeles
alone). These extreme commutes, along with a poorly conceived policy to
discourage automobile use by intentionally increasing road congestion on
highways, has resulted in adverse environmental outcomes. Despite the
most stringent clean car and clean fuel mandates in the nation, California’s
annual air pollution from vehicles actually increased for the first time since
such data was collected as drivers face ever longer—in distance and time—
commutes.8
The key conclusion from this Second Dataset is that CEQA lawsuit
abuse is worsening California’s housing crisis, increasing air pollution,
increasing the global emissions of greenhouse gas that the state has vowed
to reduce, and perpetuating and protecting segregation patterns by class
and race. Given the social and political values of Sacramento’s elected
officials, I have concluded that if these CEQA practices were not pursued by
powerful Sacramento special interests “in the name of the environment,”
they would have been roundly condemned - and ended - many years ago.
In short, the need to update CEQA litigation rules and end lawsuit
abuse is stronger than ever.

II.

CEQA Litigation by the Numbers (2013-2015): After the Great
Recession, Even More Lawsuits Target Projects in Existing
Communities, Especially Housing.

Our First Dataset9 captured the end of the Great Recession, when
California’s housing market collapsed. During this time, the federal
government was issuing substantial grant funding for “shovel ready” public
infrastructure (like the California High Speed Rail Project) and green energy
upgrades (ranging from LED lighting retrofits for K-12 schools to the
construction of large new wind and solar power generation facilities) under
the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. CEQA lawsuits filed
in the First Dataset were about evenly split (49%/51%) between lawsuits
targeting public agency projects for which there were no private applicants
or “business” sponsor and lawsuits challenging housing or office buildings
or other private sector projects sponsored by applicants needing public
agency approvals or public funding.

8. Melanie Curry, Report: CA Emissions Shrinking—Except for Transportation,
STREETS BLOG CAL (Aug. 23, 2017), https://perma.cc/8434-CUP6.
9. DeHerrera, Friedman, & Hernandez, supra note 4.
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A.

Fifty-Nine Percent of CEQA Lawsuits Target Housing,
Public Service/Infrastructure Projects, and Agency
Plans/Regulations.

In the Second Dataset, as shown in Figure 1, the return of private
capital to the market after the recession bumped up the number of private
applicants seeking government approvals, and the relative share of CEQA
lawsuits targeting private sector projects jumped from 51% to 58%. As was
true for the First Dataset, the top three categories of lawsuit challenges were
housing projects, followed by agency plans and regulations (most of which
are local agency plans to increase housing or improve and diversify
transportation infrastructure). Rounding off the top three CEQA lawsuit
targets were public service and infrastructure construction projects, most of
which were located within and served existing communities. In the First
Dataset, these three categories of projects comprised 53% of all CEQA
lawsuit targets. In the Second Dataset, these project categories accounted
for 57% of all CEQA lawsuit targets.
Figure 1: Residential, Public Service & Infrastructure Projects, and
Agency Plans and Regulations, Account for 59% of CEQA Lawsuits (20132015)
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B.

Most CEQA Lawsuits Target Projects in Urban
Population Centers, Not Rural or Remote Natural
Preserve Areas.

Although CEQA lawsuit anecdotes and political rhetoric often focus on
protecting natural lands and wilderness areas, in the First Dataset 55% of
these lawsuits were filed in the San Francisco and Los Angeles regions, and
only 22% of CEQA lawsuits were filed in the combined regions of the
Mojave, Sierras, Central Coast, Sacramento, and Northern California (all
counties north of San Francisco and Sacramento). In the Second Dataset,
the pattern of CEQA lawsuits as a tool used primarily in existing urban
population centers increased. The Bay Area and Los Angeles region
increased from 55% to 58% of the state’s total volumes of CEQA lawsuits.
Los Angeles had more than twice as many CEQA lawsuits as the next most
litigious region, San Francisco. All 9 regions had some CEQA lawsuits, but
the regions with more natural wilderness areas had the fewest CEQA
lawsuits: fewer than 10 lawsuits were filed in the Mojave and Sierras, and
only 22 CEQA lawsuits were filed in all counties north of Sacramento.
Figure 2: Los Angeles Region Accounts for 38% of CEQA Lawsuits
Statewide
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C.

The Vast Majority of CEQA Lawsuits Target Infill
Projects in Existing Communities, not Greenfield
Projects on Undeveloped Lands.

In the First Dataset, about 80% of the CEQA lawsuits challenging
projects that involved physical construction were located within the existing
development patterns of existing communities, which is a definition of
“infill” used by the state agency responsible for CEQA’s statewide regulatory
“Guidelines,” the Governor’s Office of Planning & Research.10 Infill locations
either fell within existing city boundaries, or within unincorporated county
areas already surrounded by development, such as San Lorenzo in Alameda
County and Marina Del Rey in Los Angeles County. Unincorporated county
areas at the fringe of existing cities or the edge of unincorporated county
communities, even if adjacent to existing development, were tallied as
“greenfield” projects, as were projects in agricultural and other undeveloped
areas. In the First Dataset, only 20% of CEQA lawsuits filed statewide
challenged projects in Greenfields.
In the Second Dataset, the percentage of CEQA lawsuits aimed at infill
projects jumped 7%, from 80% to 87% of the CEQA lawsuits challenging
construction projects. Projects targeted in Greenfields fell to 12% of CEQA
lawsuits filed statewide.
Figure 3: Vast Majority of CEQA Lawsuits Target Projects in
Existing Communities

10. Governor’s Office of Planning and Research, Infill Development,
CA.GOV, https://perma.cc/3G99-YTGX.
28

Hastings Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 24, No. 1, Winter 2018

As part of the regional sorting methodology applied to our Second
Dataset, this statewide tally hid more startling statistics: within the 9
counties of the San Francisco Bay Area, for example, 100% of all CEQA
lawsuits were filed against projects in infill locations. Even within the
Central Valley regions, most often criticized for allowing “sprawl”
development, more than 70% of all challenged projects were in infill
locations.

D.

Infill Housing Remains Top Target of CEQA Lawsuits.

New housing projects were the most frequent target of CEQA lawsuits
for which there was a private sector applicant in both the First Dataset and
Second Dataset. However, the percentage of CEQA lawsuits against new
housing units actually increased—from 21% to 25%—in the Second Dataset,
even as California’s housing shortage reached crisis dimensions.11 The
percentage of CEQA lawsuits challenging higher density housing projects
like apartments and condominiums also increased—from 45% to 49%—
while the percentage of CEQA lawsuits challenging single family homes (or
second units such as “granny flat” additions to single family homes)
dropped from 17% to 13%. In both Datasets, the majority of challenged
housing projects statewide were higher density—structures containing
multiple housing units like apartments and condominiums—and located in
more urbanized areas in regions with higher population densities.
Figure 4: Multi-Family Apartments and Condominium Projects Are
Top Target of CEQA Lawsuits Challenging

11. Matt Levin, California’s Housing Crisis – It’s Even Worse Than You Think,
MERCURY NEWS (Aug. 28, 2017), https://perma.cc/K49U-4P4P.
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The regional subset of CEQA lawsuit housing data in the state’s two
most populous regions, the San Francisco Bay Area and the Los
Angeles/Inland Empire/Orange County region, paints a vivid picture of how
clearly CEQA housing lawsuits clash with current policies encouraging
higher density urban development and increased transit utilization.
Regional Dataset highlights include:
1.

One Hundred Percent of Bay Area CEQA Housing
Lawsuits and 98% of the Los Angeles Region’s CEQA
Housing Lawsuits Target Infill Housing in Existing
Communities.

Infill housing was far more likely to be targeted by CEQA lawsuits in all
coastal regions of the state. One hundred percent of challenged housing
projects in the San Francisco region were in infill locations, and 98% of San
Diego’s challenged housing, 82% of Northern California’s challenged
housing projects, and 72% of the Central Coast region’s challenged housing
projects were infill. Even in the rural expanse of Northern California, which
runs from the coastline to the Nevada border and includes vast open spaces
and low population densities, 82% of challenged housing projects were
infill—and in the Sierra Foothills 100% of challenged housing projects were
infill. Only in the San Joaquin Valley—which has a booming rate of housing
production filled by displaced Bay Area families forced to “drive until they
qualify” for affordable rents or home prices, and then endure daily
commutes of three hours or longer—were the primary targets of CEQA
housing lawsuits in greenfield rather than infill locations. The two regions
with the most CEQA lawsuits, Los Angeles and the San Francisco Bay Area,
also top state and national charts on high housing prices, high homeless
populations, housing supply shortfalls, and unaffordable housing costs that
drive poverty.
2.

Los Angeles Region Hit with Far More CEQA Housing
Lawsuits Than Any Other Region.

In Los Angeles, 33% of CEQA lawsuits target housing projects, far
greater than the 24% of CEQA housing lawsuits filed statewide. In the
Second Dataset, 13,946 housing units and a 200-bed homeless shelter were
targeted by CEQA lawsuits in the Los Angeles region during the three-year
study period. In the state’s other major population centers, only 25% of
CEQA lawsuits challenged housing projects in the San Diego region, 22% in
the Bay Area region, and 16% in Sacramento. CEQA lawsuits targeting
housing in more rural areas were much less likely, except in the Central
Coast counties of Santa Cruz, Monterey, San Louis Obispo, and Santa
Barbara where housing challenges comprised 33% of all CEQA lawsuits.
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3.

Transit-Oriented Urban Housing – Apartments and
Condos – Are Top Target of CEQA Housing Lawsuits in
LA Region.
Under one of the state’s most important climate laws, Senate Bill
375,12 regional transit agencies are required to identify parts of the region
best served by public transit and adopt plans to encourage higher density
housing (like multi-story apartment and condominium complexes) to help
create riders for transit systems and discourage private automobile use. The
least costly—and most common—of these higher density, transit-oriented
housing projects are built with wood frames in a mid-rise range of four to six
stories. The costliest—and least common—of these projects are high rise
towers, required to be constructed from steel and concrete instead of wood
frames. Most of these are rental apartments instead of purchased
condominiums, and some include some ground floor retail or other
nonresidential uses. Just over half (52%) of California’s existing housing
units are single-family homes, another 9% are attached products like
townhomes and duplexes, and 27% of existing housing units are low and
mid-rise apartments or condominiums. Only 1% of Californians live in high
rise towers, which are by far the most expensive to construct, rent or buy.13
Notwithstanding the state’s adopted climate and environmental laws and
policies to promote higher density transit oriented housing, this form of
housing remains the top target of CEQA lawsuits.
We studied the Los Angeles region—the five counties and 191 cities
falling within the jurisdiction of the Southern California Association of
Governments (SCAG) regional transit agency—to better understand the use
of CEQA against housing projects. With SCAG’s assistance, we mapped the
location of each challenged housing project, as well as the project’s
approved number of housing units.
In Figure 5, we first depict this information against the backdrop of the
region’s best transit locations (around rail stations or in High Quality Transit
Corridors (HQTC) with frequent commute hour bus service). 70% of the
challenged housing units—10,188 housing units—were located within the
transit priority areas and high-quality transit corridors where the state’s
climate and related environmental policies say we should be building most
housing.

12. S.B. 375 of 2007-08, Stats. 2008, ch. 728, at 85.
13. Nathaniel Decker, Carol Galante, Karen Chapple & Amy Martin, Right
Type, Right Place: Assessing the Environmental and Economic Impacts of Infill Residential
Development Through 2030, Mar. 7 2017, https://perma.cc/96RY-ECW7.
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Figure 5: 70% of LA Region’s CEQA Lawsuits Target Transit
Oriented Higher Density Housing

Another inconvenient truth is that LA CEQA housing lawsuits
disproportionately target new housing in whiter, wealthier, healthier
communities. Some of the political support for protecting the CEQA
litigation status quo come from environmental justice advocates who extoll
CEQA lawsuits as a tool for protecting poor communities of color that
already suffer from disparately high levels of pollution. In response to
environmental justice concerns, the Legislature directed California
Environmental Protection Agency (Cal EPA) to map environmentally
disadvantaged communities.14 Cal EPA prepared these maps based on
metrics that include higher poverty and unemployment rates, lower
educational attainment levels, higher populations of non-English speakers,
higher rates of asthma and other health conditions associated with
pollution, and more nearby sources of pollution such as freeways and
contaminated factories.15 The Second Dataset makes clear that, in fact,
CEQA lawsuits are most often filed to challenge projects in whiter, wealthier
healthier communities. As shown in Figure 6, 78% of challenged housing
units were located outside the boundaries of these mapped disadvantaged
communities.

14. Stats. 2012, ch. 830.
15. S.B. 535, Disadvantaged Communities,
https://oehha.ca.gov/calenviroscreen/sb535.
32

OEHHA,

(Apr.

2017),

Hastings Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 24, No. 1, Winter 2018

Figure 6: 78% of Challenged Housing Units Located in Whiter,
Wealthier, Healthier Areas of LA Region

The disparate use of CEQA lawsuits in whiter, wealthier, healthier
communities extends beyond housing to other categories of CEQA lawsuits,
such as lawsuits challenging transit improvements, school and park
renovations, local land use plans, and upgraded infrastructure. Figure 7
includes the housing project lawsuit targets, and depicts in black dots the
location of other types of projects targeted by CEQA lawsuits. Less than 2%
of lawsuits were outside the developed “urbanized areas” of the region, and
most CEQA lawsuits are filed in West LA and in pockets of wealthier
communities elsewhere in the region.
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Figure 7: More CEQA Lawsuits Challenge Projects in Wealthier
West Side Areas

III. CEQA Lawsuits and Equity: Disproportionate Use of CEQA to
Target Apartments and Condos Perpetuates Land Use
Segregation by Race and Class.
California has a severe housing shortage, and the housing that is
available is unaffordable to most California families. One study completed
in 2016 by former State Senator Don Perata on behalf of the Infill Builders
Federation compared the price of purchasing a home in traditionally less
expensive cities in the Bay Area and Los Angeles to the average incomes of
traditionally middle class workers like teachers, police and firefighters, retail
clerks, UPS delivery drivers, postal workers, truck drivers, and nurses.16 At
the time of the survey, homes in the San Gabriel Valley in Los Angeles had
an average housing price of $611,000. A 20% down payment and other onetime expenses required savings of $140,530, and resulted in a mortgage
payment of $3,150. The mortgage payment alone was more than 80% of the
total after tax income of teachers, police and firefighters and truck drivers

16. ”So You Think You Can Afford A Home in California?”, Personal
Correspondence, Senate Pro Tem Emeritus Don Perata to Jennifer
Hernandez, (May 2017) (on file with author).
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and was nearly twice the take home pay of retail clerks.17 The best paid of
these middle wage job earners, nurses and UPS delivery drivers, needed to
spend more than 70% of their take-home pay on their monthly mortgage.18
The Perata study confirmed that full-time workers at what were once good
jobs simply cannot afford housing in many areas of Los Angeles and San
Francisco.19
CEQA is one of the well-recognized culprits in California’s housing
supply and affordability crisis.20 As UC Berkeley Economics Professor Enrico
Moretti, an advocate for increasing density and productivity in urban
regions, recently reported in the New York Times:
Look at Silicon Valley. It has some of the most productive labor
in the nation, and some of the highest-paying jobs, but
remarkably low density because of land-use regulations. . . .
Building anything taller than three stories, even on empty lots
next to a train station, draws protests from homeowners.
And once a project is approved, it faces an endless series of
appeals and lawsuits that can add years of delay. Appeals are
remarkably easy and affordable to file and can be done
anonymously. This basically gives every neighbor a veto over
every new project, regardless of how desirable the project might
be. It’s as if Blackberry had veto power over whether Apple
should be allowed to sell a new iPhone.
To make things worse, well-intentioned regulations are often
used by neighborhood groups to further delay projects. The
California Environmental Quality Act, for example, was written to
protect green areas from pollution and degradation . . . Its main
effect today is making urban housing more expensive. It has
added millions of dollars of extra costs to a sorely needed highrise on an empty parking lot on Market Street in downtown San
Francisco.
The Bay Area’s hills, beaches and parks are part of the area’s
attractions, but there is enough underused land within its urban

17.
18.
19.
20.
Smother
HKC3].

Id.
Id.
Id.
Chang-Tai Hsieh and Enrico Moretti, How Local Housing Regulations
the U.S. Economy, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 6, 2017), https://perma.cc/W7C6-
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core that the number of housing units could be greatly increased
without any harm to those natural amenities.21
Understanding why CEQA is such a problem weaves together two
stories: a short history on how the existing land use patterns were set
decades ago, and the strong legal bias against change embedded in CEQA.

A.

Much of California’s Existing Urban Land Use Patterns,
the “Setting” Against Which Environmental Impacts Are
Measured and Must Be “Mitigated” Under CEQA, Exist
As A Result of Historic Race and Class Segregation.

California communities, like many other communities throughout the
country, have a long history of resisting higher density apartments that are
affordable to workers earning lower wages—especially workers from minority
groups such as African Americans, Latinos, and Asians. Former President
Obama cited this history, and particularly the expansive use of land use and
zoning laws, in a report confirming that racial and economic class
segregation had actually increased rather than decreased in recent years.22
A recent publication by author Richard Rothstein presents a
remarkably thorough history of how zoning and land use laws were designed
to promote discrimination against African Americans and other
communities of color, recounting disturbing evidence of successful efforts
by numerous Bay Area communities to racially segregate.23 By requiring
large lot single family homes, imposing high development fees, and
prohibiting or refusing to approve rental apartments or smaller, more
affordable homes like duplexes, California communities became segregated
by both race and class.24
As dispassionately explained in Color of Law, during World War II,
factories producing ships and other war material hired women and ethnic
minorities to fill out their workforce. In the Richmond shipyards in the Bay
Area, the federal government helped support the dramatic growth of new
workers near wartime factories by helping finance mortgages for single
family homes.25 However, federal policy excluded African American workers

21. Hsieh & Moretii, supra note 20.
22. Housing Development Toolkit, THE WHITE HOUSE (Sept. 2016),
https://perma.cc/3MAW-A8PN.
23. RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN HISTORY OF HOW OUR
GOVERNMENT SEGREGATED AMERICA (2017).
24. Id. at 2.
25. Id. at 8–9.
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from both mortgage assistance and home ownership.26
Instead of
accumulating family wealth by making payments on a mortgage, AfricanAmerican workers paid rent for much smaller rental apartments with far less
parkland and other neighborhood amenities. These differential housing
programs—single-family home ownership for whites and rental rooming
houses for African-Americans—were implemented in compliance with
financing and land use agency rules designed to enforce segregation even in
California communities that had no prior history of housing segregation.27
After the war, Richmond’s factory workers remained racially integrated with
the return of veterans to the workforce, with jobs paying wages that allowed
all workers to move up the economic ladder. When Ford Motor Company
decided it needed a larger new factory than its wartime Richmond facility,
Ford decided to move about forty miles south to Milpitas in Santa Clara
County, and the company offered job transfers for its Richmond workers.28
White workers could trade their equity in Richmond homes to buy new
homes in Milpitas and nearby Santa Clara county, and did so.
African-American workers, however, were shut out of proximate
housing near the new factory by the combination of newly applied
discriminatory financing rules, which denied African Americans access to
veterans loans and federally insured mortgages, and local “character-ofcommunity” land use zoning laws, which required larger lots and singlefamily homes (and prohibiting apartments) that were unaffordable to
Richmond’s African American community. This was further compounded by
a legacy of spending their salaries on rent rather than the wealth
accumulation mortgage payments made by their white home owning
coworkers.29
Milpitas and Santa Clara county both used discriminatory large lot
single family home zoning, as well as high development fees, to price out
African-American families near the new Milpitas Ford factory. Over time,
Ford’s African-American workforce—now forced to commute more than
eighty miles daily—decreased substantially, and was further tainted by
reports of unreliability based on commute-related tardiness. Meanwhile,
Ford’s white workforce had moved on and up to the next level of home
ownership, and any grandchild fortunate enough to have kept that modest
three-bedroom ranch home in Milpitas purchased by a white wartime worker
scored a financial grand slam given average home values of $909,900.30

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id. at 68.
Id. at 115.
Id. at 119-121.
Id. at 174.
Milpitas Home Prices and Values, ZILLOW, https://perma.cc/YQY3-ACTQ.
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Workers unable to afford housing due to official government actions
that discriminated on the basis of wealth and race never took that first step
into middle class stability and wealth accumulation. Every three years, the
Federal Reserve evaluates consumer wealth, and every year, the family
wealth of homeowners has increased in relation to the family wealth of
renters.31 The latest complete survey, which includes data from 2010-2013,
showed that a homeowners’ net worth is 36 times greater than a renters’ net
worth ($194,500 v. $5,400).32 With the latest surge in home prices, the
prediction is that the 2014-2016 dataset due to be released later next year
will show a wealth differential of 45 times.33 Homeowners have much more
wealth available to deal with college tuition, temporary job loss, illnesses,
and other family emergencies. As noted in the Color of Law, notwithstanding
civil rights reforms in the late 1960s:
Seventy years ago, many working- and lower-middle-class African
American families could have afforded suburban single-family
homes that cost about $75,000 (in today’s currency) with no
down payment. Millions of whites did so. . . . The Fair Housing
Act of 1968 prohibited future discrimination, but it was not
primarily discrimination (although this still contributed) that
kept African Americans out of most white suburbs after the law
was passed. It was primarily unaffordability. The right that was
unconstitutionally denied to African Americans in the late 1940s
cannot be restored by passing a Fair Housing law that tells their
descendants they can now buy homes in the suburbs, if only they
can afford it. The advantage that FHA and VA loans gave the
white lower-middle class in the 1940s and ‘50s has become
permanent.34
Implementation of these civil rights reforms cannot be taken for
granted, but require the dogged enforcement advocacy and litigation in each
of the successive decades by civil rights advocacy groups such as the
Greenlining Institute cofounded by John Gamboa,35 to assure that minority
communities get fair access veterans loans, small business loans, insurance

31 Jesse Bricker, et al., Changes in US Family Finances from 2010 to 2013:
Evidence from the Survey of Consumer Finances, 100 FED. RES. BULL. 4 (Sept. 2014).
32. Id.
33. Lawrence Yun, How Do Homeowners Accumulate Wealth?, FORBES (Oct.
14, 2015), https://perma.cc/BP38-XYM7.
34. Rothstein, supra note 23, at 182–83.
35. THE GREENLINING INSTITUTE, http://greenlining.org/ (last visited Nov.
8, 2017).
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guarantees, and similar middle-class wealth creation programs of the federal
and state government. In the forty years since the enactment of the Fair
Housing Act, minority home ownership rates and household wealth had
substantially improved, and the gap between minority and white families
was shrinking.36 That is, until the Great Recession’s predatory lending
practices, which disproportionately targeted minority communities to take
out mortgages that could never be repaid, wiped out decades of progress
and plunged a disproportionately high number of minority families into
foreclosure and rental housing.37
Our current urban “environment” continues to be dominated by single
family homes in neighborhoods consisting of other single-family homes. A
recent UC Berkeley study concluded that 62% of California households are
single family homes, and another 9% live in town homes or duplexes.38
Changing single family home neighborhoods by adding more
residents, more traffic, and more kids using schools and parks challenges
decades-old housing patterns. Additionally, bringing people who cannot
afford to purchase single family homes in what has become million-dollar
neighborhoods due to housing shortage challenges these patterns rooted in
race and class discrimination. The core legal structure of CEQA, which
measures “environmental” impacts against the existing setting, protects the
existing characteristics of those neighborhoods and thus perpetuates land
use practices founded in race and class discrimination.
It is noteworthy that CEQA was enacted in 1970, in the midst of the
same era of civil rights advocacy and legal reforms. CEQA was also among
the first of the modern era of environmental laws, and pre-dated scores of
later laws that established mandates for the environmental degradation that
dominated headlines in the 1960s and 1970s—mandates requiring clean air
and water, public access to the coastline, stewardship of public lands, and
the management and cleanup of household and industrial wastes. CEQA’s
much more generalized framework of disclosing and minimizing “harm” to
the environment has never been integrated into the fabric of other
environmental laws, and over the years has resulted in what Governor Jerry

36. John Gamboa, Forward Economic Summit Remarks (2017), COMMUNITY
BUILDERS CALIFORNIA; see also Laura Gambia, Homeownership and the Wealth Gap,
COMMUNITY BUILDERS CALIFORNIA, (May, 2016); see also Gillian White, The
Recession’s Racial Slant, THE ATLANTIC, (June 24, 2015), https://perma.cc/DVD4W6AJ; see also Carlos Garriga et al., The Homeownership Experience of Minorities
During the Great Recession, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REVIEW (First
Quarter, 2017) at 139–68.
37. Gillian B. White, The Recession’s Racial Slant, THE ATLANTIC (June 24,
2015) https://perma.cc/VDY7-MHHB.
38. Decker, Galante, Chapple & Amy Martin, supra note 13.
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Brown has called an “amoeba” of law that is constantly expanding and
unpredictably evolving—and is now the tool of choice for resisting change
that would accommodate more people in existing communities. Meanwhile,
CEQA’s status quo defenders focus on the anecdotal use of CEQA against
traditional industrial and protecting open space lands, but ignore the far
more dominant current uses of CEQA against urban housing projects, and
the local infrastructure and service facilities required to serve the people
who live in these areas.39 The Second Dataset, with its deeper examination
of housing and regions, provides compelling evidence of CEQA litigation
abuse to perpetuate racial segregation and economic injustice.
Zoning and other legal obstacles to increasing the supply or cost of
homes in existing California communities should be critically scrutinized
and updated to address the housing crisis. As demonstrated by the
profligated use of CEQA lawsuits against infill housing in existing
communities, CEQA has prominent placement on this list of legal culprits.

B.

CEQA’s Legal Structure is Biased Against Change, and
Thereby Perpetuate Historic Racial and Economic
Segregation Patterns.

Racially and economically exclusionary zoning and land use regulatory
patterns have created California’s “existing environment” as defined by
CEQA. “Impacts” to this existing environment—ranging from temporary
construction noise, to changes in private views, to increases in the number
of kids playing in a park, going to school or using a library—are all required
to be avoided or reduced to a “less than significant level,” to “the extent
feasible given the objectives of the project.”40 CEQA does not create clear
criteria for any of these terms, nor does CEQA define what can be
considered an “impact” to the environment. Since CEQA was enacted in
1970, judges have periodically creatively interpreted the law to discover new
“environmental impacts,” like changes to private views,41 or temporary
construction noise that complies with construction noise standards required
by state and local laws,42 which then become mandatory under CEQA even
if never expressly enacted by the Legislature. Agency regulators also
routinely propose expansions to CEQA to include more “impacts” that

39. See generally CEQA Works, CEQA Successes, http://ceqaworks.org/ceqasuccesses (noting several instances of CEQA successes in protecting the
environment and public health).
40. Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 15130(a)(2).
41. Pocket Protectors v. City of Sacramento, 124 Cal. App. 4th 903, 904 (2004).
42. Keep Our Mountains Quiet v. Cty. of Santa Clara, 236 Cal. App. 4th
714, 716, (2015).
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require study and mitigation,43 which in turn lead to greater compliance
costs, and more CEQA lawsuits as the precise scope of CEQA’s expanded
requirements are litigated over the next decade or longer.
As we discussed in our first study, CEQA lawsuits provide a uniquely
powerful legal tool to block, delay, or leverage economic and other agendas
after a project is approved. CEQA lawsuits can be filed by anyone
(anonymously), pursuing any agenda (including perpetuating or expanding
racial and economic segregation, gaining an advantage over a business
competitor, or leveraging money or other economic concessions such as a
labor agreement from a project sponsor), even if the project causes no harm
to the environment or public health. The most common remedy in CEQA
lawsuits is for a court to vacate— reverse—agency approval of the challenge
project pending a redo of the CEQA process. Since CEQA now requires an
evaluation of more than 100 topics and sub-topics, appellate courts have
found CEQA compliance deficiencies—typically for one part of one study—
in nearly half of the CEQA reported appellate court decisions.44
The majority of Californians—two-thirds statewide and even 70% in
the notoriously NIMBY Bay Area—support building more housing in their
communities.45 Californians recognize and want to help solve the state’s
housing crisis, which has adversely affected adults, children, college
students, renters, businesses large and small that rely on a stable and
diverse workforce, and backbone community contributors like teachers,
nurses and firefighters. However, CEQA lawsuits are uniquely antiDemocratic, and uniquely vulnerable to being hijacked for racist and other
discriminatory objectives, as well as pursued for economic gains, that would
be abhorrent and unlawful if openly acknowledged.
Housing can be built, and it is politically supported by majorities of
existing residents, including those who are protective of the character,
services, and property values in their community across the country.
However, CEQA lawsuits provide California’s anti-housing holdouts—the
political minority of as few as one anonymous party—with a uniquely
effective litigation tool to simply say “no” to change. By filing a CEQA
lawsuit alleging that the agency approving the project has made a mistake in
analyzing one or more of the nearly 100 impact issues that must be
addressed after nearly 50 years of evolving regulatory and judicial

43. Daniel R. Golub & Elizabeth Lake, New Regulations Could Expand CEQA
Review of Impacts to Common Birds, HOLLAND & KNIGHT (Aug. 24, 2015),
https://perma.cc/A8XV-DNLG.
44. DeHerrera, Friedman, & Hernandez, supra note 2, at 19–22.
45. Katy Murphy, A Portrait of Housing NIMBY-ism in California, MERCURY
NEWS (Sept. 27, 2017), https://perma.cc/9XX7-NNXK.
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interpretations of CEQA, this political minority can slow projects or stop
them all together.
As noted in our first report, it is also very inexpensive to file a CEQA
lawsuit, as courts demand only a few hundred dollars to accept a new
lawsuit. The outcome of CEQA lawsuits is extraordinarily unpredictable; a
metastudy of many types of lawsuits against agencies shows that agencies
win about 80% of such lawsuits, and the chaos that would result from a
pattern of agency losses prompted Congress to demand that the Internal
Revenue Service track lawsuit outcomes and clarify or amend regulations
that resulted in lawsuit losses.46 In contrast, several studies of CEQA lawsuit
outcomes show a very different pattern. Agencies lose nearly half of CEQA
lawsuits, and further, agencies lose even more than half of lawsuits
challenging smaller projects for which the agency concluded would cause no
“significant” impacts.47
When a judge decides that an agency should have conducted its CEQA
preapproval review process differently, even if the error is confined to
whether the traffic flow at a single intersection was appropriately counted,48
the most common CEQA judicial remedy is to “vacate” the project approval
until more environmental analyses is completed. This remedy can be
applied even to partially constructed or even completed occupied homes. In
an infamous example in Los Angeles, for example, a judge vacated the City’s
approval of a high-rise apartment project that was already occupied, and
tenants had to be escorted out. The City’s CEQA violation in that case was a
court decision that disagreed that the City had appropriately enforced a
CEQA mitigation measure requiring the “preservation” of a non-historic
building façade as part of the new high rise apartment by allowing the
common sense approach of allowing the façade to be temporarily
dismantled, and then re-assembled and attached to the new high-rise, which
was in fact done.49 This incident was described in our first report, and the

46. Daniel R. Golub, Jennifer L. Hernandez, & Joanna L. Meldrum, CEQA
Judicial Outcomes: Fifteen Years of Reported California Appellate and Supreme Court
Decisions, HOLLAND & KNIGHT (May 2015), https://perma.cc/PVM7-H2H8.
47. Id.
48. David McAfee, Calif. Appeals Court Affirms SF Win in Waterfront Project
Row, LAW 360 (Aug. 27, 2013), https://perma.cc/GR7A-KS4E.
49. Bianca Barragan. Anti-Density Lawyer May Have Just Forced 40 People Out
of Their New Gomes in Hollywood’s Sunset/Gordon, CURBED L.A. (Oct. 20, 2014),
https://perma.cc/VAC8-GTKJ; see also, David Zahniser, Judge’s ruling on
Sunset/Gordon tower puts tenants in limbo. L.A. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2014),
https://perma.cc/WVD7-PABA.
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building remains vacant—more than 3 years later—pending the completion
of more CEQA review.50
Those who successfully sue under CEQA can seek recovery from the
public agency or private applicant their attorneys’ fees as well as a
multiplier, based on the theory that enforcing CEQA confers a benefit on the
environment and thus the public.51
Those filing CEQA lawsuits
anonymously, or even for openly extortionate purposes, are protected from
becoming the target of CEQA lawsuits by California’s anti-SLAPP (strategic
lawsuits against public participation) statute, and are entitled to treble
damages if improperly targeted by a lawsuit.52
Because of the uncertainty in CEQA’s requirements,53 the time (3 to 5
years, with some examples extending to 9 and 10 years) required to
complete the trial and appellate court proceedings, and the extreme
consequences of an adverse judicial outcome that vacates project approvals,
once a CEQA lawsuit is filed it becomes very difficult for a public or private
project to access project financing (bank loans or equity investors) or grant
funding. To timely complete politically favored projects, the Legislature has
passed “buddy bills” granting remedy reform to CEQA lawsuits involving
billionaire sports stadiums, corporate headquarters, and the Legislature’s
own office building.54 However, the Building Trades blockade on CEQA
reforms that would reduce CEQA’s value as a leverage tool to secure Project
Labor Agreements has left California’s housing crisis at the ongoing mercy
of CEQA lawsuits.55
The founder of one of the most prolific CEQA plaintiff law firms, Clem
Shute, in recently accepting a lifetime achievement award from the
environmental section of the California State Bar Association, endorsed the
need for CEQA litigation reform:

50. DeHerrera, Friedman, & Hernandez, supra note 2, at 65.
51. Arthur F. Coon, Successful CEQA Petitioners May Recover Attorneys’ Fees for
Administrative Proceedings and Are Not Disqualified by Nonpecuniary Stake, MILLER
STARR REGALIA (Nov. 7, 2011), https://perma.cc/YB45-9CG7.
52. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16.
53. The uncertainty of CEQA’s requirements was most remarkably noted
by the California Supreme Court itself, when it decided a lawsuit involving
how CEQA should be applied in the context of greenhouse gas and climate
change. The Court identified several “pathways” which “may”—or may not—
be acceptable under CEQA, and remanded the issue for further
consideration by the lower courts. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Dep't of Fish &
Wildlife, 62 Cal. 4th 204, 195 (2015).
54. Asemb. B. X3 5, (2009), https://perma.cc/QK3C-GEHM; S.B. 292,
(2011); S.B. 743, (2013); Assemb. B. 1935, (2014).
55. DeHerrera, Friedman, & Hernandez, supra note 2.
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Moving to the bad and ugly side of CEQA, projects with merit
that serve valid public purposes and not be harmful to the
environment can be killed just by the passage of the time it takes
to litigate a CEQA case.
In the same vein, often just filing a CEQA lawsuit is the
equivalent of an injunction because lenders will not provide
funding where there is pending litigation. This is fundamentally
unfair. There is no need to show a high probability of success to
secure an injunction and no application of a bond requirement
to offset damage to the developer should he or she prevail.
CEQA has also been misused by people whose move is not
environmental protection but using the law as leverage for other
purposes. I have seen this happen where a party argues directly
to argue lack of CEQA compliance or where a party funds an
unrelated group to carry the fight. These, in my opinion, go to
the bad or ugly side of CEQA’s impact.56
In short, the act of filing a lawsuit, with no showing of harm to people
or the environment, and no showing of the likelihood of winning on the
merits, should not be the equivalent of winning an immediate injunction
against a project—a project that has often been shaped by more than two
years of community input and approved by elected leaders—with neither a
hearing nor a bond.
This economic and legal model of CEQA lawsuits—concealing the
identity of those filing and funding CEQA lawsuits, low lawsuit costs, nearly
50% probability of winning, attorneys and bonus awards for successful
challengers, and no material financial costs for unsuccessful litigants—has
created a robust cottage industry for lawyers and consultants on both sides
of CEQA lawsuits. And because CEQA applies only to new projects that
require government approval or funding, CEQA’s legal structure provides a
fearsome shield against change. CEQA lawsuits put a sword in any
opponent of change, motivated by any reason, including but by no means
limited to protecting housing patterns rooted in race and class
discrimination.

IV. CEQA Lawsuits and Traditional Environmental Values: The
Ongoing Fight Against Housing by “Slow/No Growth”

56. E. Clement Shute, Jr., Reprise of Fireside Chat, Yosemite Environmental Law
Conference, 25 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW NEWS, 3 (2016).
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Environmental Advocates.
Although sometimes derisively referred to as “Not In My Backyard”
(NIMBY) advocates, “slow growth” has historically been identified as a proenvironmental agenda and is closely aligned with historic preservation
advocates as well as “Save Open Space and Agricultural Resources” (SOAR)
land use controls directly enacted by voters in numerous California
communities.57 Efforts by slow growth communities to shut down housing
production and population growth have been largely successful. For
example, Marin County, located immediately north of San Francisco, limited
population growth to 2% between 2000 and 2010, even though the state as a
whole grew by 10% and the counties immediately north of Marin grew at
nearly triple the rate of Marin. It is not coincidental that Marin also had the
region’s oldest population, earning the top ranking in the number of
residents aged 50 or older.58 Ventura County, another stronghold of no
growth politics, had a healthier growth rate at 9%, but this was dwarfed by
the non-coastal Riverside and San Bernadino counties that grew by 42% and
19%, respectively.59 It is no coincidence that Marin County has also been
targeted for violating federal fair housing laws enacted to combat racial
segregation.60
Only one Bay Area county accommodated its fair share of population
growth: Contra Costa grew by 10.5%.61 Meanwhile, immediately outside the
9-county Bay Area region, the Central Valley region’s San Joaquin County
grew by 22%, while population growth immediately adjacent to the Bay Area
region rose to 22%.62 Growth rates in more distant reaches of the Bay Area
have anti-housing policies so severe that both counties actually lost
population in the last census round (2000 to 2010) even though the housing
supply crisis in both regions was already acute. Numerous commenters

57. Growth Results Mixed in November Balloting; Ventura Slow-Growthers
Succeed, but Others Fail, CP&DR (Dec. 1, 1998), https://perma.cc/8MSN-RL5N].
58. Association of Bay Area Governments, A Diverse and Changing
Population (2015), https://perma.cc/SJ9N-TNMT.
59. Census Viewer, Population of Ventura County, California,
https://perma.cc/JAW6-DCH6; Joe Matthews, Growth Limits Have a Downside,
THE SACRAMENTO BEE (Aug. 10, 2016), https://perma.cc/49PG-DHMF.
60. Richard Halstead, Marin Housing Forum Highlights Federal Pressure To
Reverse Segregation, MARIN INDEPENDENT JOURNAL (Apr. 4, 2016),
https://perma.cc/VDK4-L2RL.
61. Association of Bay Area Governments, supra note 58.
62. Popluation of San Joaquin County, California: Census 2010 and 2000
Interactive Map, Demographics, Statistics, Graphs, Quick Facts,CENSUSVIEWER,
https://perma.cc/M7QQ-V8QF.
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have observed that it is not possible to reconcile the climate priority of
encouraging infill housing with anti-housing no-growth communities.
However, these communities—like Ventura, Marin and San Francisco’s
wealthiest old guard anti-housing neighborhoods—also produce stalwart
environmental advocates and deep pocket donors for environmental and
climate advocacy efforts, and it is at best awkward to challenge the antihousing sentiments of funders. A new generation of progressive advocates
is doing so, including state Senator Scott Weiner and YIMBY (Yes In My
Backyard) California co-founders, Sonja Troust and Brian Hanlon.63
Even California’s premier climate champion, former state Senator Fran
Pavley, deferred to her NIMBY neighbors in failing to support 2016
legislation to allow “granny flats” to be built in existing single-family
homes.64 Since many single family homes were built when families were
much larger, and homeowners tend to remain in their homes rather than
move to smaller homes after their kids leave, these “accessory dwelling
units” offer a virtually invisible method for a “win-win” outcome. “Granny
flats” create new, lower cost housing—and new income sources for
homeowners. Even this most modest of changes to existing neighborhoods
has prompted CEQA lawsuits against individual units, and against local
zoning regulations that allow such units to be constructed.65 The Color of Law
is a remarkable new history of the abuse of presumptively “color-blind” laws
and regulations, such as land use zoning, infrastructure, and workface labor,
and how they were intended to—and in fact did—discriminate against
African Americans in California and other states.66 Taking a page out of the
Color of Law, to assure that wealthy enclaves of single family homes remain
unblemished by the occasional college student or in-law moving into an
existing home with the dignity and privacy afforded by a separate entry door,
private bath and galley kitchen, some communities are imposing fees
nearing $100,000 to convert an extra bedroom and bathroom into a studio
apartment. Additionally, current building standards can cost another
$100,000 or more in building retrofit, and even small “granny units” of less

63. Loren Kaye, You Can Have Infill Housing or an Unreformed CEQA, but Not
Both, FOX & HOUND (Apr. 6, 2017), https://perma.cc/TV5Q-GA34; Scott Beyer,
California State Senator Scott Wiener: 'San Francisco's Progressives Lost Their Way on
Housing', FORBES (Jan. 31, 2017), https://perma.cc/D3YH-ASHW; Brock
Keeling, Alissa Walker, Can a Grassroots Movement Fix Urban Housing Shortages?,
CURBED (July 20, 2017), https://perma.cc/AE7Y-A45U.
64. Mike McPhate, California Today: A Housing Fix That’s Close to Home, N.Y.
TIMES (May 16, 2017), https://perma.cc/KTD8-UPUP.
65. Josie Huang, Court Ruling Forces LA to Cut Back on 'Granny Flat' Permits,
SCPR (Apr. 7, 2016), https://perma.cc/2777-ABBF.
66. Rothstein, supra note 23.
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than 700 square feet can cost $300,000 or more—assuming no CEQA lawsuit
challenges are filed by neighbors.67
The fight between traditional environmental advocates (i.e., older
homeowners seeking to protect the character of their communities) and
newer environmental advocates (i.e., younger workers unable to afford
housing and deeply concerned about climate) has played out in two recent
fights over the soul, and control, of local Sierra Club chapters. In Seattle,
which has produced far more housing than San Francisco despite occupying
a smaller region, a group of primarily millennial environmental advocates
nominated each other to leadership positions on the local Sierra Club
chapter, and then elected themselves as the new generation of Sierra Club
leadership.68 Overnight, the Sierra Club in Seattle was converted from a
preservationist-first, anti-change hammer set to pound any local official
tempted to vote for new housing into a pro-housing, pro-transit supporter of
evolving mix of higher density urban neighborhoods with multiple ranges of
housing prices and lower per capita greenhouse gas emissions. The YIMBYs
arrived, and with them, the Sierra Club’s endorsement of prolific new
housing production in Seattle.
The same tactics failed in two rounds of elections with the fierce old
guard leaders of San Francisco’s Sierra Club chapter. Although the national
headquarters office is located downtown and has long hosted local Sierra
Club meetings, the San Francisco chapter has resorted to meeting in the
homes of old guard members to try to dissuade YIMBY members from
participating in chapter activities, let alone seeking leadership positions.
The old guard declined to even allow YIMBY advocates to be included on the
ballot for local chapter leadership positions—a decision that was eventually
reversed by the national Sierra Club after several rounds of appeals by
YIMBY club members. In San Francisco, unlike Seattle, the Sierra Club
continues to fight new housing projects—and has never advocated for any
new housing project—and woe to the ambitious politician in San Francisco
who fails to earn the Sierra Club chapter’s endorsement.69
For traditional environmentalists committed to preserving the
character of their existing community (notwithstanding its probable origin in
the race and class based zoning practices of the last century), the awkward
truth is that fighting urban density undermines climate leadership. As
summarized in a recent Bay Area Sierra Club newsletter article, “How do you
convert a NIMBY into a YIMBY?:”

67. Red Oak Realty, Home Truths: Should You Add an Accessory Dwelling Unit
to Your Home?, BERKELEYSIDE (Feb. 8, 2017), https://perma.cc/F26Q-82GT.
68 Interview with Sonja Trauss, California Yes In My Backyard Party CoFounder (Oct. 2, 2017).
69. Id.
47

Hastings Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 24, No. 1, Winter 2018

Studies have established a clear correlation between urban
density and reduced carbon emissions. A 2014 report from the
University of California, Berkeley . . . found that families living in
denser urban cores had a carbon footprint that was half that of
families living in suburbs.
YIMBYs want more than just interconnected [smart growth]
neighborhoods – they also want housing to be affordable. Such
policies can lead to tension with those residents—often older,
whiter, and more affluent—who don’t want traffic, congestion,
and other effects of urban density, such as shadows from highrise buildings. The conflicts play out before zoning boards, city
councils, and other public bodies where young YIMBYs turn out
to support large housing projects. The NIMBYs who oppose
them are often progressive, environmentally minded individuals
who believe in climate action and recognize that sprawl is
unsustainable; they just want to preserve the look and feel of the
neighborhoods they call home.70
CEQA lawsuits are the perfect tool for the holdout NIMBY. These
NIMBYs are like the two individuals who disagreed with the majority vote in
multiple Berkeley ballot initiatives to increase density near BART, and
decided to file a CEQA lawsuit against a downtown apartment project with
the desire to maintain enough room on BART for them to sit instead of
stand.71 CEQA also proved to be the perfect tool for the trio who launched
more than twenty lawsuits against the same redevelopment project in Playa
Vista over a span of nearly thirty years,72 and for the environmentalist lawyer
who halted granny units in all of Los Angeles.73 There is irony and tragedy in
preserving this fealty to status quo of CEQA lawsuit rules in a state that
prides itself on innovation, creativity, and creative (and profitable)
disruptive technologies, products and services.

70. Jonathan Hahn, Pro-Housing Urban Millennials Say “Yes In My Backyard”,
SIERRA (Aug. 23, 2017), https://perma.cc/KS4R-VE73.
71. Alexander Barreira, Residents Sue City Over Environmental Assessment of
Harold Way Project, THE DAILY CALIFORNIAN (Jan. 18, 2016),
https://perma.cc/2MCY-7L8F.
72. Patrick Range McDonald, Playa Vista Quicksand, L.A. WEEKLY (Sept. 19,
2007), https://perma.cc/4WME-HRWN.
73. Emily Alpert Reyes, 'Granny Flats' Left in Legal Limbo Amid City Hall
Debate, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 28, 2016), https://perma.cc/R967-DHB5.
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The fact that NIMBY behavior also effectively discriminates against the
minorities barred by law and then practice from many California
communities is an uncomfortably racist reality only rarely acknowledged by
environmental advocacy groups funded by NIMBYs. As documented in a
2014 University of Michigan study of 191 environmental non-profits, 74
government environmental agencies, and 28 leading environmental grant
making foundations, “The State of Diversity in Environmental
Organizations,” were funded by environmental group supporters. Despite
increasing racial diversity in the United States, the racial composition in
environmental organizations and agencies has not broken the 12% to 16%
“green ceiling” that has been in place for decades. Confidential interviews
with environmental professionals and survey data highlight alienation and
“unconscious bias” as factors hampering recruitment and retention of
talented people of color. Efforts to attract and retain talented people of
color have been lackluster across the environmental movement.74
Bias begets blindness: NIMBY use of CEQA lawsuits against multifamily infill housing to protect the “character of their community”—too often
used as a code word for excluding “those people”—should have been
roundly condemned by environmental advocates who routinely espouse a
commitment to equity and environmental justice. Instead, support for antihousing NIMBY-ism remains firmly rooted in the environmental activist
world, prompting Professor Enrico Moretti to resign from his multi-decade
membership in the Sierra Club:
Thanks to aggressive lobbying by an odd coalition of Nimby
homeowners and progressives – radical county supervisors, tenants’
unions, environmental groups – in places like San Francisco and
Oakland, it takes years (and sometimes even decades), harsh political
battles and arduous appeals to get a market-rate housing project
approved.
Some restrictions make sense: Nobody wants skyscrapers poking up
among Victorian houses, and nobody wants to tear down historical
buildings. But many others don’t: There are scores of empty parking lots
in San Francisco and Oakland that can’t be built on because of political
opposition.
Bay Area urban progressives, by fighting new housing in their
neighborhoods, cause more sprawl on the rural fringes. I’m a committed
environmentalist, and it made me rethink the way I engage with such
issues: For example, I was a member of the Sierra Club for more than a
decade. But because of all the unwise battles waged by the San

74. Dorceta E. Taylor, The State of Diversity in Environmental Organizations,
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN, Green 2.0, 1-5, 2 (July 2014).
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Francisco chapter against smart housing growth in the city, I quit to
support other environmental groups.75

V.

CEQA Lawsuits and Climate Leadership: Why CEQA Lawsuits
and Agency Proposals to Expand CEQA Threaten California’s
Climate Leadership and Perpetuate Racial and Economic
Injustice.

Climate change was not on anyone’s radar screen when CEQA was
enacted in 1970. Governor Brown and others have described climate change
as an “existential” threat to the planet,76 which requires immediate and
dramatic changes in how we power our homes and factories, how we travel
every day, and how our entire economy functions.77 The status quo of
CEQA’s litigation rules directly and indirectly undermines California’s
climate leadership.

A.

Political Resiliency and Climate Change.

Climate change is important to Californians and our elected leaders.78
However, the housing crisis, ranging from an explosion in the homeless
population, to the unavailability of middle class housing affordable, to
teachers and other middle-income workers, now consistently polls much
higher than climate change as a priority for Californians—along with other
immediate, pragmatic concerns that affect everyone daily, like health care,
transportation and schools.79
The Governor’s climate change regulators have proposed scores of
measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and help California achieve

75. Enrico Moretti, Fires Aren’t the Only Threat to the California Dream. N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/03/opinion/californiafires-housing.html.
76. Evan Halper, Melanie Mason, Patrick McGreevy, Gov. Brown Unveils
Plan for Global Climate Summit, Further Undercutting Trump's Agenda, L.A. TIMES
(July 6, 2017), https://perma.cc/J53B-5S7G.
77. AB 32 Scoping Plan, California Air Resources Board (July 14, 2017),
https://perma.cc/B9TH-9R6Y.
78. David Kordus, Californians’ Views on Climate Change, PUBLIC POLICY
INSTITUTE OF CALIFORNIA (July 2016), https://perma.cc/9EJB-U7W9.
79. Mark Baldassare, Dean Bonner, David Kordus, Lunna Lopes, PPIC
Statewide Survey: Californians and Their Government, PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE OF
CALIFORNIA (Sept. 2017), https://perma.cc/NB67-GGZH.
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its climate change objectives. While increased transportation80 and energy
costs of climate measures has been extensively documented,81 measures
that substantially raise housing costs are less published (e.g., the fact that
“net zero” homes cannot meet ten year cost effectiveness criteria required by
statute, as recently confirmed by the California Energy Commission Building
Standards division).82
Overall, climate regulations already imposed or under consideration
for adoption as part of the 2017 “Scoping Plan” to achieve California’s
greenhouse gas reduction goals place a disproportionately high burden on
those households that have had to move further inland, drive longer
distances, live in climates requiring more air conditioning and heating, and
rent or purchase housing made more costly by CalGreen’s new climatebased building codes. Even more astonishing, however, are climate agency
proposals to actually expand CEQA—increasing both compliance costs and
litigation risks—for all new projects, including desperately needed new
housing.
Increasing housing costs and expanding CEQA hit hardest at the same
California households that have been priced out of urban housing markets.
For example, the Office of Planning and Research (OPR) has proposed to
expand CEQA to make driving one mile (even in an electric car) a new CEQA
impact requiring “feasible” mitigation.83 OPR has also proposed to expand
CEQA to make building one mile of new highway capacity (even to relieve
congestion, or to build a carpool lane) a new CEQA impact.84 Both new
impacts are proposed as part of a climate policy initiative of intentionally
increasing traffic congestion to induce people to switch from cars to buses
(or where available, to rail).85 OPR’s proposal to expand CEQA has in turn
been endorsed by California’s lead climate agency, the California Air
Resources Board (CARB), in its 2017 Scoping Plan proposal.86

80. Dale Kasler & Jim Miller, Will You End up Paying More for Gas Under
California’s Cap-and-Trade Extension?, THE SACRAMENTO BEE (July 18, 2017),
https://perma.cc/L25M-8JWR.
81. Kate Galbraith, On Climate, a Rough Road Ahead for California,
CALMATTERS (July 18, 2015), https://perma.cc/N9RE-KWPU.
82. California Energy Commission, Zero Net Energy Strategy
Presentation (8/22/17) (on file with author).
83. Governor’s Office of Planning and Research, Revised Proposal on
Updates to the CEQA Guidelines on Evaluating Transportation Impacts in CEQA (Jan.
20, 2016), https://perma.cc/8EWJ-MV3Y.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Cal. Air Res. Bd., 2017 Climate Change Scoping Plan Update, at 113
(Jan. 20, 2017), https://perma.cc/853R-6PJ4.
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Expanding CEQA as a global climate strategy with the intention of
forcing families—and disproportionately minority households—that are
already priced out of proximate housing, and already burdened by high
housing costs and crushing commutes, will earn a future “Color of Law”
dishonorable badge of bureaucratic shame when applied to the reality of
hard working Californians who are forced to drive ever longer distances, for
ever longer periods of time, to get to housing they can afford. In fact,
expanding CEQA to intentionally increase traffic congestion
disproportionately hits those households without access to adequate
housing the hardest: all Californians have to pay new gas taxes for road
maintenance, and all have to pay higher gas prices as part of the cap and
trade program, but only aspiring families wanting to purchase their first
home or rent housing they can afford will bear the cost of an expanded and
vague new “vehicle mile travelled” and “traffic inducement” mitigation
mandate that applies only to newly approved plans and projects.
CARB’s proposed 2017 Scoping Plan takes an even more expansive
approach with CEQA, recommending that “all feasible” mitigation measures
reducing greenhouse gas be required for all new projects and plans, with no
direction as to how much is enough, or how much more economic burdens
should be placed on new greenhouse gas reductions in relation to CEQA’s
myriad other impacts and mitigation mandates for new housing,87 like
school fees, inclusionary housing fees, and other fees that can add more
than $100,000 to the cost of each housing unit (even small rental
apartments).88 Like the OPR CEQA expansion proposal, the CARB CEQA
expansion proposal places a disparate (and case-by-case, lawsuit-bylawsuit) new greenhouse gas reduction obligation on new housing, above
and beyond the many greenhouse gas reduction mandates already imposed
on new housing construction by regulations such as California’s extensive
“green” building code, and housing-related climate mandates applicable to
other sectors such as electricity generation, transportation, and waste
management.89
Groups studying the equity impacts of policies to increase urban
density have consistently found that those being displaced earn lower
incomes than those able to afford the limited numbers of shiny new
apartments and condos being built in urban core job centers, and have
identified census bureau data supporting their claim. Figure 8 shows the
outward migration of African American families from core cities like San
Francisco, Oakland, and San Jose to outlying suburbs like Santa Rosa,
Fairfield and Antioch—and to even more communities in the San Joaquin
Valley.

87. Id. at 151–52.
88. Id. at 39.
89. Cal. Code Regs. Title 24, Part 11, https://perma.cc/SV9W-B8ZU.
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Figure 8: African American Family Migration from Urban Core
Cities (2000-2010)

The housing crisis has already resulted in severe poverty rates,
homelessness, and the diaspora of racial minorities to ever more distant
locations. To then use climate policy generally, and CEQA specifically, to
charge a fee or otherwise require an unquantifiable level of “mitigation” for
every mile travelled for those forced to “drive until they qualify” for housing
they can rent or own clearly is precisely the type of disparate impact
highlighted in decades of discriminatory government policies in Color of Law.
Similarly, to intentionally increase traffic congestion as a climate
strategy—which will inevitably result in greater tardiness for those workers
forced to live farther away from jobs by the housing crisis—is to replicate
the sin of the land use regulators in Milpitas and Santa Clara county faced
with the socially unacceptable outcome of accepting a racially integrated
change to the character of their community. Whether in the name of climate
or community character, minority commuters driving forty miles each way to
the Ford factory in Milpitas increased segregation since a reliable and
racially diverse workforce simply “can’t be counted on” to get to their jobs
promptly. Under this latest version of disparate impact government
policies, many more workers (especially those with lower educational
attainment levels) are likely to suffer from OPR’s strategy to use CEQA to
intentionally increase road congestion, where the solution is less likely to be
a whiter, more proximate workforce and more likely to be robotic workforce
with fewer overall workers.
While some climate advocates have focused on developing and
rapidly deploying clean car technologies, OPR and seven other
state agencies have proposed to increase their authority over
local land use decisions, and impose urban growth boundaries
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(which have been proven to increase housing costs and limit
supplies), charge development in urban areas an extra fee to pay
for natural land conservation stewardship activities, and
prioritize new development on the top target of CEQA lawsuits—
high density, transit-oriented housing—at the same time they
are expanding CEQA into the uncharted and litigious new
territory of vehicle mile travelled and traffic inducement
“impacts.”90
Meanwhile, notwithstanding billions of dollars in new investments,
ridership on public transit has dropped in all California regions,91 and the
nation’s most authoritative transit access study continues to confirm that
fewer than 10% of jobs can be accessed even in a 60-minute commute on
public transit in any metropolitan region of California.92
In a democracy that depends on majority votes, California’s climate
policy must be politically resilient—and it cannot be blind to the race and
class of those targeted with higher cost burdens, nor can it be blind to the
hardships felt by the 40% of California’s working families living below or near
the poverty line.

B. Global Greenhouse Gas Consequences of Housing Crisis
Leakage.
California’s climate laws mandate dramatic reductions in greenhouse
gas emissions (GHG) generated within the geographic boundaries of
California.93 GHG emissions that occur outside California are not counted in
California’s GHG emissions inventory, nor are these emissions required to
be reduced. These GHG emissions include emissions from manufacturing

90. One of the state’s most prominent experts on traffic studies, Ron
Milam of the firm Fehr & Peers, recently reported that there are numerous
competing methodologies for attempting to calculate vehicle miles
travelled, that VMT growth tracks population and economic activity growth
and is not reduced by current transit systems, and emerging transportation
technologies like app-based ride services as well as automated vehicles are
actually increasing rather than decreasing VMT. See Ronald T. Millam, Fehr
& Peers (2017) (on file with author).
91. Laura J. Nelson, L.A. Bus Ridership Continues to Fall; Officials Now Looking
to Overhaul the System, L.A. TIMES (May 23, 2017), https://perma.cc/PR4R-G5K8.
92. Center for Transportation Studies, Access Across America, UNIVERSITY OF
MINNESOTA (2017), https://perma.cc/J3CT-V9GA.
93. S.B. 32, 2015–2016 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2016); Assemb. B. 32, 2005–2006
Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2006).
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smart phones, solar panels, computers, and cars bought and used by
Californians. Although California has created many “green jobs”—mostly for
construction workers installing solar panels—there is also a steady exodus
of workers and their families who move to other states. A study by The
Sacramento Bee of U.S. Census Bureau records found that every year from 2000
to 2015, more people left California than moved in from other states.94 The
Bee estimated that the net outward migration during that period was 800,000
people. In a 2017 poll, half of all respondents reported that they were
considering moving out of California because of high housing costs.95
The top destinations for these Californians are Texas, Arizona, Nevada,
Washington, Oregon, and Colorado. However, every time someone moves
from California to any of these other states, global GHG emissions actually
increase because per capita GHG emissions are much higher in each of
these states, as shown in Figure 10. For example, the per capita GHG
emissions in Texas are nearly three times higher than California’s per capita
GHG emissions. California has worked very hard to reduce its GHG
emissions and already achieved very significant decreases. However, to
reduce the next tranche of GHG emissions by the dramatic levels required by
law, California’s climate leaders need to decide whether to embrace policies
that recognize equity, civil rights, the political need for local resiliency and
global effectiveness over time, or are we simply playing a shell game to drive
ever more people (and their cars) out of California even if global GHG
emissions actually increase?

C.

Building Housing Unaffordable to Middle Wage
Workers Exacerbates Segregation and Promotes
Political Instability, and Threatens California’s Climate
Leadership.

The core housing priority informing current climate policies is to build
smaller housing units in taller existing multi-family buildings. State climate
laws seek to reduce single family home construction. Existing cities and
areas long included in plans have also complied with California’s GHG
reduction laws. Even ignoring Fannie Mae’s data showing ongoing strong
consumer preferences for single family homes, both for empty nest

94. Philip Reese, California Exports Its Poor to Texas, Other States, While
Wealthier People Move In, THE SACRAMENTO BEE (Mar. 5, 2017),
https://perma.cc/Q6WV-NCGY.
95. Drew Lynch, Californians Consider moving to rising housing costs, poll finds,
CAL WATCHDOG (Sept. 21, 2017), https://perma.cc/5LNT-RQLH.
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households with seniors and for millennials,96 the archetypal housing
produced favored by climate advocates is simply unaffordable to middle
income earners. In a recent report by UC Berkeley’s Terner Center for
Housing Innovation and UC Berkeley School of Law, the authors assumed
that the construction cost per square foot of building a 2,000 square foot
single family home was generally equivalent to the cost of building an 800
square foot low-rise apartment (generally six stories or less). Thus, the
apartment costs 2.5 times more to build compared to a single family home.97
The construction costs for apartments in high rise buildings (steel and
concrete structures) is about twice the cost of building mid-rise units.
Middle income families can still afford (barely) to buy a $400,000 home
with three bedrooms, two bathrooms, and a small yard in a distant suburb
located north or east of coastal job centers. Middle income families cannot
afford, and cannot comfortably fit, in an 800 square foot urban apartment
with monthly rents of $3500 to $4000.
Consistent with climate policy priorities, the authors of the study
recommend dramatically increasing the density of existing communities.98
To control costs, the authors recommend cheaper, smaller housing types
(duplexes, quadplexes, townhomes, and mid-rise apartments), and
development in existing communities for new units.99 The authors
acknowledge that their preferred “Target Scenario” would “not only entail the
new construction of 1.9 million units, but also the demolition and
redevelopment of tens and perhaps hundreds of thousands of units.”100
These “demolished units would consist disproportionately of those paying
“below the median rents for their neighborhoods.”101 The authors then
recommend public policy and funding solutions for displaced lower income
households.
Displacing hundreds of thousands of existing residents paying “below
median” rents falls squarely on the spectrum of other policy proposals by
academics and agencies that will disproportionately harm low-income
residents, and communities of color. Like the shameful examples described
in “The Color of Law,” like targeting low income minority communities for
large-scale demolition in redevelopment schemes that never seemed to
have enough funding to help those it hurt. Another example is promoting

96. Patrick Simmons, Baby Boomer Downsizing Revisited: Boomers Are Not
Leaving Their Single-Family Homes for Apartments 1 (2015); Patrick Simmons, Rent
or Own, Young Adults Still Prefer Single-Family Homes 1 (2015).
97. Decker, Galante, Chapple & Martin, supra note 12, at 31-33.
98. Id. at (pin cite)
99. Id. at 7.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 25.
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community safety by targeting low income communities of color for
demolition to make way for interstate highways in cities. The bottom line of
this “climate” policy is displacement of those barely hanging on to housing
in the midst of an unprecedented housing and poverty crisis in California.
Figure 9: Per Capita Greenhouse Gas Emissions By State

To date, no state agency has acknowledged the global GHG impacts
from people moving out of state due to California’s housing crisis, or
acknowledged that an effective climate policy should keep Californians at
home and at work in housing they can afford. Instead, California’s CEQA
regulators—and a coalition of seven other state agencies—have threatened
to intervene in local land use decisions with policies that increase housing
costs and target existing urban residents with demolition and displacement.
These policies do nothing to increase the housing supply, reduce
astronomical housing costs, or overcome the most significant legal barrier
to the timely completion of less expensive housing in locally and regionally
approved plans that have already been endorsed by state climate regulators
as meeting California’s climate mandates. Updating CEQA’s lawsuit rules
as suggested herein would in fact increase the timely production of the
types of housing favored by climate policies, and most frequently sued
under CEQA. As discussed below, however, these common sense CEQA
lawsuit rule reforms run afoul of one of Sacramento’s most powerful special
interests—the union leaders (and their CEQA law firms) comprising the
Building Trades Council.
Functioning infrastructure, quality public services, and more housing
all work in tandem along with the land use plans and ordinances that allow
for thoughtful integration of these related community needs. When it
becomes the norm to have dysfunctional transportation systems and
deteriorating parks and libraries, then community resistance to new housing
gets even stronger. The environmental and climate policy objectives of
encouraging higher density, transit-oriented communities become even less
likely to survive the local political approval process. CEQA lawsuits occur
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only housing projects that have managed to run this community political
gauntlet successfully, and actually get approved. There is no reliable metric
for assessing the number of housing projects and housing units that lay on
the cutting room floor from projects that never make it to or through the
local approval process. Similarly, there is no metric for projects that get
substantially downsized as part of the approval process, based on CEQA
litigation risks or threats.

VI. Why do CEQA Lawsuit Rules Still Allow Anonymous Lawsuits
to be Filed to Advance NonEnvironmental Agendas Against
Environmentally Benign or Beneficial Projects Like Housing?
A housing crisis has driven California to have the highest poverty rate
of any state in the nation (more than 20%, or nearly 9 million people,
according to the US Census)102 and that leaves 40% of Californians unable to
regularly meet basic household expenses (forced to choose between
medical care, housing costs, and other routine expenses – and one paycheck
or injury/illness away from potential homelessness, according to United Way
of California).103 Combined with 6 years of data demonstrating that infill
housing is the top target of CEQA lawsuits statewide, why has one of the
most accomplished politicians of his generation and a “progressive”
Democratic party supermajority thrown in the towel on ending CEQA
litigation abuse?
Governor Jerry Brown—the same man who was so frustrated by CEQA
during his term as Oakland Mayor that he penned an amicus brief to the
California Supreme Court which unsuccessfully sought to overturn an
appellate court decision that elevated private views from private homes as
an “impact” deserving of CEQA protection from the horror of viewing four
story town homes104—promised to reform CEQA, calling it the “Lord’s Work.”
By his fourth term, he had given up. In an interview with UCLA’s Blueprint
magazine, he was blunt in explaining why he couldn’t reform CEQA, stating
“the unions won’t let you because they use it as a hammer to get project
labor agreements.”105

102. Dan Walters, Why does California have the nation’s highest poverty level?,
CALMATTERS (Aug. 13, 2017), https://perma.cc/GMM9-QWUA.
103. Betsy Block et al., Struggling to Get by The Real Cost Measure in California
2015, UNITED WAYS OF CALIFORNIA 28 (2016).
104. Hon. J. Brown, amicus brief to the California Supreme Court in
Pocket Protectors v. City of Sacramento (No. C046247) 2005.
105. Jim Newton, Gov. Jerry Brown: The Long Struggle for the Good Cause,
UCLA BLUEPRINT (2016), https://perma.cc/QC6D-R6FD.
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Governor’s Brown’s blunt conclusion that certain construction
unions—and not the environmental advocacy groups more frequently
associated with environmental laws like CEQA—have blocked CEQA reform
was demonstrated in the following two legislative CEQA reform efforts in
2016 and 2017.

A.

Protect Anonymity - Oppose Transparency.

To try to advance one of the litigation rule changes that would end
CEQA abuse, several experienced CEQA lawyers representing both public
agencies and private applicants first requested the California Judicial
Council—which establishes court rules such as whether parties filing
lawsuits need to disclose their identity—to amend the CEQA court rules
that require disclosure at the front end of CEQA lawsuits during filing.106 The
Rules of Court already require this disclosure at the back end.107 The
disclosure is required if the party wins the lawsuit and wants to be paid
attorney fees and a bonus from taxpayers, if the lawsuit is against a public
agency, and if the lawsuit challenges a permit issued to a private party. The
Rules of Court also already require those filing “friend of court” briefs when
they are not a party to the lawsuit to disclose their identity and interests.108
The Judicial Council, most of whom are appointed by the Legislature, balked
at our request. The rationale was that requiring disclosure of who sues
under CEQA was a policy decision to be made by the Legislature.109 Working
with several senior CEQA lawyers who represent both public agencies and
private sector applicants, some members of the legal team who filed the
Judicial Council request then drafted legislation that would help end
manipulative abuse of overburdened superior judges by requiring those
filing CEQA lawsuits to disclose their identity and interest. Judges have
been directed by the California Supreme Court to interpret CEQA
expansively to protect the environment, but are under no such direction to
interpret CEQA expansively to advance the economic interests of
anonymous litigants.
One of these bills, Assembly Bill 2026 was then considered in a policy
committee hearing in the Legislature. The chief lobbyist for the Building
Trades (which primarily represents mechanical trade locals like mechanical,
electrical and pipefitters), strongly opposed requiring disclosure in CEQA

106. See Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 1021.5
107. Id.
108. Cal. R. Ct 8.520 (c).
109. DeHerrera, Friedman, & Hernandez, supra note 4, at 78-79.
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lawsuits, saying this change would “dismantle” CEQA.110
All major
environmental groups that routinely lobby in Sacramento—like the Sierra
Club and California League of Conservation Voters—piled on, inexplicably
opposing simple disclosure and transparency by those filing CEQA lawsuits.
The hearing was particularly ironic in that these identical labor and
environmental lobbyists had just urged expanding the transparency
requirements of the Coastal Commission—but irony was in short supply in
this tense face-off between political integrity and political patronage.
Patronage won: while the Democratic chair chided the labor lobbyist by
noting that was hard to see why transparency would “dismantle” CEQA, the
legislative amendment was defeated in a party line vote.111
Others have documented union use of CEQA lawsuits, but such
information is hard to come by—and hard to readily verify using online
resources—since unions rarely sue in their own name and instead make use
of the anonymous CEQA lawsuit abuse route.112

B.

Protect Duplicative Lawsuits: Allow Anyone to Litigate
Every Approval, Every Time—Unless Projects Pay
Prevailing Wages and Use Apprenticeship Program
Workers.

California has an elaborate web of laws aimed at requiring every
community to adopt land use plans that balance economic growth,
environmental protection, and equity (including affordable housing for low
income Californians). None of these plans can be approved without first
completing the CEQA process, most often an Environmental Impact Report
(EIR). Developing these plans and the EIR generally takes 1-3 years, costs
hundreds of thousands and sometimes millions of dollars, involves an
extensive community outreach process, and advisory vote by appointed
planning commissioners, and a final vote by an elected City Council or
Board of Supervisors. These plans identify where future housing and
transportation improvements are supposed to be located, as well as parks,
employers, schools and other land uses. The plans also identify how much
housing should go where, often with a range that allows for future

110. Assembl. Natural Resources Comm.: Hearing on A.B. 2002 and A.B. 2026
(Apr.
2016)
http://calchannel.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view_id=7&clip_id=3592.
111. Assembl. Natural Resources Comm.: Hearing on A.B. 2026 (Apr. 2016).
112. Documented Building Trades Union Abuse of California Environmental
Quality Act (CEQA) 2014-2017, COALITION FOR FAIR EMPLOYMENT IN
CONSTRUCTION (July 27, 2017), https://perma.cc/3D2F-YTZ6.
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adjustments within the range. These plans can then be targeted by CEQA
lawsuits, and invalidated if a judge finds that the EIR was deficient.
Even if the EIR is not flawed, and the plan takes effect without a
lawsuit or after a lawsuit, most new housing projects will need to go through
the CEQA process all over again, and the project can be sued again, even if
it complies with the plan. For big projects that require multiple approvals
over time for each phase, more CEQA is generally required for each phase,
and projects can be sued again for each phase. For some projects, these
duplicative rounds of CEQA lawsuits sometimes span twenty years, and
twenty lawsuits, or more.
The 2016-2017 Legislative sessions each took a bank shot approach to
ending duplicative lawsuits. Here’s the bank shot: CEQA already includes a
statutory exemption for projects which an agency is required to approve as
long as the project satisfies all approval eligibility requirements. For
example, if a homeowner wants to replace windows with energy-efficient
double-paned windows, some cities require the homeowner to obtain a
“building permit.” The city does not have the discretion to deny this type of
permit as long as the homeowner meets permit approval criteria (e.g., the
window is not too close to the next door neighbor).113 Local agency
approvals for apartments and condominium projects are more complicated,
and cities have generally retained the discretion to add conditions of
approval or exercise their judgement to downsize or even disapprove a
project—and CEQA applies to these “discretionary” permit decisions.
In 2016, when the housing crisis was reaching its first political
crescendo in Sacramento and the Governor declared that a state funding
solution for housing was infeasible —we could not “spend our way out of
the crisis”114—the Governor attempted to squeeze through the eye of a
needle a proposal to create a new state law that would assure that
apartments and condominium projects received “ministerial” permits as
long as the project complied with all local standards, and set aside some
units for low income residents.115 The Governor’s proposal covered only
housing projects sized and located to comply with approved city land use
plans, and as noted above, these plans have already gone through the CEQA
compliance process.
The Governor’s “ByRright” proposed permit process—in which an
applicant was entitled as a matter of law to receive a permit for a housing

113. See Window Permit Checklist, City of Berkeley Permit Service Center
(2010).
114. Liam Dillion, Governor: We Can’t Buy Our Way Out of Affordable Housing
Problem, L.A. TIMES (May 31, 2016), https://perma.cc/7TT9-FULD.
115. Liam Dillion, Why Construction Unions Are Fighting Gov. Jerry Brown’s
Plan For More Housing, L.A. TIMES (July 20, 2016), https://perma.cc/P8EK-WJGT.
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project that met strict environmental criteria—included low-income
housing, complied applicable legal standards, and was consistent with the
approved local land use plan for which CEQA had already been completed.
It would have sped up housing approvals by avoiding a second round of
costly and time-consuming CEQA studies, eliminated the potential for a
second round lawsuit against a project that complied with a plan, and used
an existing CEQA exemption having to legislatively enact a new CEQA
exemption or streamlining process. Avoiding statutory amendments to
CEQA was a political necessity, since legislators receiving the endorsement
and campaign funding contributions from the powerful Building Trades
construction union were required to make a litmus test commitment to
avoid amending CEQA. (Building Trades Council members use of CEQA
lawsuits as leverage for giving their members construction jobs is described
further in our first report, and below.)
The Governor’s “By Right” proposal in 2016 died without a single
Legislator being willing to endorse it—the proposal was never even put in
print and introduced as legislation. Opposition by Building Trades to this
proposal was vociferous,116 and other unions generally remained silent, even
though union members—who typically earn too much money to qualify for
“low income” housing and not enough to pay for housing near their jobs,
especially in the large job markets in the Bay Area and California—would
have been the major beneficiary of speeding up the approval of new housing
projects without CEQA lawsuit delays. Construction workers would get
work, and the creation of a significant new housing supply in existing
communities would have helped California catch up with a deficit of more
than one million new housing units.117
The political buzzsaw the Governor ran headlong into was the fact that
only CEQA lawsuits against specific projects which are proposed to be built
by a specific agency, company or person, create leverage required to avoid or
settle a CEQA lawsuit in exchange for entering into a private contract
between the project applicant and the union challenger. The form of private
contract is a “Project Labor Agreement,” and requires the project applicant
to use workers from specific union locals for designated types of work (and
to make financial contributions to the union’s law firm and central
leadership to help fund CEQA lawsuits against other projects).118 This use of
CEQA lawsuits and lawsuit threats is the “workaround” used to avoid
applicable federal and state laws that prohibit public agencies from

116. Id.
117. Elijah Chiland, Here’s How Serious California’s Housing Shortage Has
Gotten, LA CURBED (Mar. 4, 2016), http://perma.cc/27FS-HAGG.
118. Kimberly Johnston-Dodds, Constructing California: A Review of Project
Labor Agreements, CALIFORNIA RESEARCH BUREAU, CALIFORNIA STATE LIBRARY (Oct.
2001), https://perma.cc/TK9F-REN4.
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requiring applicants to enter into contracts with private entities like unions
as a condition of receiving agency approval. The courts have upheld a
narrower set of laws that allow agencies to require union contracts for
projects undertaken by the agency itself, and to require “prevailing wages”
for projects receiving public funds.
After 2016’s “By Right Fight,” Senator Weiner introduced Senate Bill 35,
which was quickly dubbed “By Right Light.” S.B. 35 also required ministerial
approvals of housing projects that complied with plans (and thus greatly
irritated “local control” advocates such as the representatives from the cities
and counties who wanted to retain their authority to approve, downsize, add
conditions, or deny such projects).119 However, S.B. 35 had the one magic
ingredient missing from the Governor’s 2016 proposal, which was to require
housing projects using this “ministerial” approval process to pay “prevailing
wages” and benefits to construction workers, and use construction workers
enrolled or trained in apprenticeship programs which are generally run by
Building Trades for union members.120 While the magnitude of cost increase
to housing prices caused by paying higher wages and benefits to
construction workers are disputed,121 at the low side estimate prepared by
union advocates housing costs increase by 12%,122 in a middle range as
reported by UC Berkeley’s Program on Housing and Urban Policy concluded
that prevailing wages added 9% to 37% to construction,123 and a 48%
construction cost increase was reported by Beacon Economics in a 2016
study of a prevailing wage ballot initiative enacted in Los Angeles.124 Since
California’s average home already costs 2.5 times more than the average
home price nationally, and since the US Census has concluded that high
housing costs are the reason California has the nation’s highest poverty rate,
even a 12% increase in housing costs—with no offsetting cost reductions—

119. See, e.g., League of California Cities opposition to S.B. 35,
https://perma.cc/283C-37SW.
120. S.B. 35, Ch 366, 2016-2017 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017).
121. Liam Dillion, Here’s how construction worker pay is dominating California’s
housing debate, L.A. TIMES (May 12, 2017), http://perma.cc/B42R-TTMK. See also,
Affordable Housing Cost Study, CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, 47 (Oct. 2014); Newman & Blosser, Impacts of a
Prevailing Wage Requirement for Market Rate Housing in California, CALIFORNIA
HOMEBUILDING FOUNDATION, 16 (Aug. 24, 2017).
122. Interview with Bobby Alvarado, Executive Officer, Northern
California Carpenters Union (Sept. 27, 2017).
123. Sarah Dunn, The Effects of Prevailing Wage Requirements on the Cost of Low
Income Housing, 59 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 141 (2005).
124. Christopher Thornberg et al., Measure JJJ, BEACON ECONOMICS, 19
(2016).
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makes the housing built under S.B. 35 less affordable to prospective
residents. S.B. 35 was signed into law on September 29, 2017.125
Use of a putatively color-blind law like CEQA to extract labor
agreements continues a regrettable history by some unions to seek
economic advantages for their members at the expense of African Americans
and other minorities, who along with younger Californians are disparately
impacted by California’s housing crisis and CEQA’s structural bias in favor of
the status quo. As well documented in The Color of Law:
The construction trades continued to exclude African Americans
during the home and highway construction booms of the postwar
years, so black workers did not share with whites the substantial
income gains that blue collar workers realized in the two big
wage growth periods of the mid-twentieth century—war
production and subsequent suburbanization. African Americans
were neither permitted to live in the new suburbs nor, for the
most part, to boost their income by participating in suburban
construction . . .
A 1960’s executive order covering contractors on federally funded
constructed projects prohibited racial discrimination and
required affirmative action to recruit African Americans. Yet
when a new central post office was authorized for Oakland,
California (on land cleared by displacing more than 300 families,
mostly African American), not a single black plumber, operating
engineering, sheet metal worker, ironworker, electrician or
steamfittwer was hired for its construction. When the Bay Area
Rapid Transit subway system (BART) was built in 1967, not a
single African American skilled worker was hired to work on it.
The Office of Federal Contract Compliance blamed the unions, all
certified by the National Labor Relations Board, for not
admitting black members. The BART general manager allow that
although BART was “committed to equal opportunity,” it was
unwilling to insist on nondiscrimination because that might
provoke a work stoppage and “[o]ur prime responsibility to the
public . . . is to deliver the system . . . as nearly on time as we
possibly can.”
Although federal regulations provided for
termination of a contractor for failing to comply with the nondiscrimination order, no penalty was ever imposed.”126

125. S.B. 35, supra note 120.
126. Rothstein, supra note 23, at 161, 168–69, and 223–36 (regarding
discrimination against Latinos, Asians, and other “non-caucasions”).
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C.

Impose Nuclear Option of Reversing Project Approvals
For Minor Glitches in Thousands of Pages of Technical
Report; Allow only Good Buddies to Fix Studies While
Building Projects.

A parade of what our first report calls “Buddy Bills”—limiting CEQA
lawsuit judicial remedies and speeding up lawsuit schedules for politically
favored professional sports owners and the Legislature itself—were
introduced since we completed our first report, and most were approved.
For example, the Legislature decided that its own office building should not
be affected by the delays and cost overrun risks that occur with CEQA
lawsuits, and in an uncodified budget bill gave itself the same remedy
reform deal as it gave its favorite hometown basketball team in the Kings
Arena Buddy Bill (S.B. 743) introduced and enacted in the last 72 hours of
now Mayor (then Senate leader) Darryl Steinberg. The NBA champion
Warriors got a deal to expedite the outcome of their CEQA lawsuit, but bills
to give the same expedited lawsuit deal to an office tower, LA basketball
arena, and corporate headquarters project remain stalled after the first year
of this legislative session.
The Legislature’s willingness to shelter itself and favored political
cronies from the nuclear option of CEQA’s most common judicial remedy
has been forcefully and repeatedly criticized by the editorial boards of
California’s major newspapers, which have demanded the same CEQA
judicial remedies for the rest of us.127 To allow housing projects to be
derailed by NIMBY and labor lawsuits, while shielding its own office building
and sports venues from CEQA lawsuit delays, shines the brightest of lights
on why the much-publicized Legislative “housing package” of 2017 will do
little to nothing to get a lot more housing built, and as the Governor noted
will actually increase housing costs at a time when housing is already
unaffordable to average California households.128

127. CEQA for thee, but not for me, THE ORANGE COUNTY REGISTER (June 24,
2016), http://perma.cc/4GCS-UENQ; Liam Dillion, A key reform of California’s
landmark environmental law hasn’t kept its promises, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2017),
http://perma.cc/L24V-F5GN; Scott Peters, CEQA an obstacle for needed housing in
California, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIBUNE (Mar. 3, 2017), http://perma.cc/ZP7KWCUS; Jim Wunderman, California can’t reach greenhouse-gas targets without CEQA
reform, S.F. CHRONICLE (July 23, 2015), http://perma.cc/BQJ8-CJ6L; CEQA reform
bill falls short, SF GATE (Aug. 16, 2014), http://perma.cc/QLL4-MA9G.
128. Dan Walters, Walters: Bills would make California housing even more
expensive, THE MERCURY NEWS (Aug. 16, 2017), http://perma.cc/MQ7Q-LBAQ;
Liam Dillion, The housing package passed by California lawmakers is the biggest thing
65

Hastings Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 24, No. 1, Winter 2018

VII. Who’s Responsible for Perpetuating CEQA Litigation Abuse
Against Housing?
Using CEQA lawsuits over and over in the same communities, often for
nonenvironmental reasons, remains fiercely defended by an alliance of
NIMBY environmental advocates and building trade union leaders—both of
which are backbone supporters of the elected legislators in the two-thirds
majority Democratic Party in the Assembly and Senate. This coalition has
created an iron curtain of opposition to reforming CEQA lawsuit rules to get
more housing produced more quickly in locations that have already gone
through at least one round of prior CEQA review. Governor Brown, who
called CEQA reform “the Lord’s work” when he came into office seven years
ago—after directly experiencing CEQA delays and cost overruns in his
efforts to bring 10,000 new housing units to downtown Oakland during his
two terms as Oakland’s mayor—conceded last year that the politics of CEQA
reform were extremely difficult “because labor likes to use CEQA lawsuits to
secure P[project] L[abor] A[greements].”129 PLAs are private deals cut
between a project sponsor and a particular union local. For projects and in
territories where multiple union locals vie for jobs, multiple CEQA lawsuits
have been filed against the same project. By threatening or filing and then
settling a CEQA lawsuit, union locals gain leverage to demand PLAs that
require that its members get a negotiated set of project jobs. Even projects
that are required by law, or agree to pay, the “prevailing wages” established
by a state agency (which are typically just under three times higher than
local wages for comparable work), find themselves targeted with CEQA
lawsuits and lawsuit threats by union locals that demand that jobs go to
their members – payment of prevailing wages alone is not sufficient.130
It is no coincidence that the campaign watchdog organization Maplight
has discovered that construction unions are also the largest single donor to
Sacramento legislators with campaign contributions in excess of $4 million
for the most recent years data is available, with the next five highest interest
groups, including state and local government employees and police and fire
fighters unions, each falling below $3 million.131

they’ve done in years. But it won’t lower your rent, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 15, 2017),
http://perma.cc/Q694-BL8T.
129. Jim Newton, supra note 105.
130. See Liam Dillion, Here’s how construction worker pay is dominating
California’s housing debate, L.A. TIMES (May 12, 2017), http://perma.cc/ B42RTTMK.
131. See Interest Groups, MAPLIGHT, http://perma.cc/9JMC-7C98.
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Data showing that the vast majority of California’s union workers, who
make too much money to qualify for subsidized “low income” affordable
housing, but not enough to rent (let alone buy) a home near where they
work, suffer most acutely from the housing crisis combination of an acute
housing supply shortage, extremely high housing costs, and daily commutes
that for many workers (including construction workers) now extend to three
hours or more each day (and cause some workers to sleep in pickup trucks
near job sites away from their families for much of the week).
Nevertheless, although more than 130 housing bills were introduced
to address the housing crisis in 2017, as the Los Angeles Times editorial board
critically noted:
[L]egislators and Brown are still avoiding some of the most
controversial, and possibly, effective reforms. What about changes to
the California Environmental Quality Act, which is too often used to
block or shrink infill, transit-adjacent housing developments that are
132
exactly the kind of environmentally-friendly projects the state needs?

Such entreaties, and the housing needs of its members, have not
moved building trade leadership to reconsider its “transactional” use of
CEQA lawsuit threats to force PLAs. Not since the prison guards union was
the most powerful union in Sacramento—powerful enough to secure CEQA
exemptions for prisons which then incarcerated generations of young
people—has a trade union so completely controlled the “environmental”
priorities that CEQA once protected.

Conclusion: Prayer for Relief
In August of 2016, I joined more than 100 fellow Democrats on the
lawn of former State Treasurer Phil Angelides in Sacramento in a fundraiser
for Hilary Clinton. Former President Bill Clinton spoke at the event, and
graciously praised California for its innovation economy, its environmental
leadership, and its generous funding of Democratic party candidates. He
then gave us all a jolt when, with a sharp eye and serious tone, he explained
that when he was growing up in Arkansas, “everyone knew that if you worked
hard and played by the rules, you’d do better than your parents. That wasn’t
true if you were black, and we needed to work on that. But it was true for the
rest of us.”
Having secured our attention, he went on to explain that for too many
Americans—including people living not too far away from where we were

132. See Times Editorial Board, To End the Housing Crisis, California Leaders
Can’t Be Afraid to Put All Options on the Table, L.A. TIMES (May 27, 2017),
http://perma.cc/BU7S-2783.
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standing in the Central Valley—that promise that you’d do better than your
parents if you worked hard and played by the rules hadn’t been true for far
too long, in some areas, for generations. He said what we have now in
America just wasn’t ok, and we needed to all acknowledge—both parties—
that we’d made some mistakes. “None of us knew,” he said, “what
globalization was going to mean for American workers, for manufacturers.”
And now that we do know, “we have to acknowledge the pain, we have to
work on restoring upward mobility and the American dream, to the huge
numbers of people in vast areas in the country that are suffering.”
President Clinton spoke to my heart with that speech, and he spoke to
my own background as a child of Pittsburg, California, where struggling
families are still suffering from the shutdown of so many California factories
in the 1980s and 1990s. And in that crowd of Hilary supporters, I saw the
silos, the walls we have created between the haves and have-nots, where
many in the crowd—including the top ranking environmental regulators in
the Brown administration—stiffened with resistance to the notion that they
bore any responsibility for creating or solving the suffering of so many.
Instead, I saw in the crowd a shudder of rejection—“those people” and
“those jobs” are at odds with our politically correct policy priorities, which
are best addressed at tony conferences among the well-dressed and welleducated where “those people” are tucked away discretely behind kitchen
doors and valet stations.
I saw that rejection in CEQA lawsuits across the state that oppose
housing for “those people,” like the lawyer challenging a Habitat for
Humanity affordable housing project in downtown Redwood City133 that will
block part of the view from the single family home he converted to an office
more than twenty years ago.
I saw it in the vitriol of opponents of a Planned Parenthood clinic
relocating to an existing office building, in a CEQA lawsuit134 spanning more
than three years, based on the city’s failure to evaluate the environmental
consequences to noise and public safety that the litigants have themselves
promised to cause if the clinic is allowed to open. I see it in the three other

133. Friends of Cordilleras Creek v. City of Redwood City, No. CIV517288,
2013 Cal. Super. LEXIS 11599, at 1, 2 (Nov. 15, 2013).
134. Respect Life South S.F. v. City of South S.F., No. 524437 (Cal. Super.
Ct. Filed July 2, 2014); Respect Life South S.F. v. City of South S.F., 15 Cal.
App. 5th 449 (2017).
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CEQA lawsuits targeting health care facilities in Kern County,135 San
Leandro,136 and Willits.137
I saw the kids that will attend school in trailers, and never experience
the school improvements built and funded, but stalled by CEQA lawsuits in
El Cerrito,138 Mill Valley,139 San Mateo,140 Mendocino, Los Angeles,141 and
Imperial County.
I saw the kids and grownups sidelined by CEQA lawsuits against parks
in Salinas,142 San Rafael,143 San Francisco,144 Newport Beach,145 Albany146 and
Marina Del Rey.147
I saw patrons of San Francisco’s library,148 the Gene Autrey Museum,149
and the San Martin Mosque as these projects spend their limited funds on

135. Tehachapi Area Critical Land Use Issues Group, (Cal. Super. Ct.
Cnty. of Kern. Filed Oct. 19, 2011).
136. Preserve San Leandro Mobility v. City of San Leandro, 2010. Cal.
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Filed May 4, 2015).
138. CEQA Working Group, CEQA Misuse Case Study: Portola Middle School,
El Cerrito, (Oct. 6, 2017), https://perma.cc/8D3G-W3M9.
139. Citizens for Educated Government v. Mill Valley School District,
(Cal. Super. Ct. Marin Cnty. Filed July 18, 2011).
140. Alliance for Responsible Neighborhood Planning et al. v.
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lawyers fussing about the details of traffic studies drag on for years after
everyone thought their project was “approved.”
I saw the emergency communication services of Los Angles, Google’s
internet fiber project, metro projects, bicycle plans, shuttle bus services,150
tree removals in Beverly Hills151 and tree plantings in Santa Monica,152 and
sediment removal in a water reservoir, all arrayed in front of a harried
superior court judge asking—reasonably—what is the environmental
problem that brings you to my court, and then diving into thousands of
pages of detailed study for that “gotcha” moment when the judge says, “let’s
vacate this whole approval and just go back to fix this one thing.”
And I saw thousands of stalled affordable housing units projects153
scrambling for funding given the demise of California’s redevelopment tax
increment laws, apartments next door to new transit stations that cost
California’s trusting taxpayers billions of dollars to construct, and
apartments in neighborhoods in virtually every California community with
struggling strip malls and cleaned up industrial lands, perfectly situated for
residential use.
These projects—all included in the stacks of more than 1,000 CEQA
lawsuits in our offices—don’t get any more “environmental” or “equitable”
with time. The housing crisis has gotten worse, the migration of
Californians to lower cost states with higher per capita GHG has made
global climate change worse, and the burden of these misbegotten
government policies once again falls disproportionately harder on people of
color struggling for a fair shake, not a hand shake and environmental
platitudes. The status quo created by CEQA’s litigation rules is morally and
environmentally unconscionable. Modest reforms, not “buddy bills” or
sweeping exemptions, will restore CEQA to its important role in protecting
the environment and public health. The housing crisis, and the suffering of

149. Highland Park Heritage v. City of Los Angeles, (Cal. Super. Ct. Cnty.
of L.A. Filed July 26, 2011).
150. Coalition for Fair, Legal and Environmental Transit v. City of S.F.,
(Cal. Super. Ct. Cnty. of S.F. Filed May 9, 2014).
151. Homeowners of Angelo Drive to Save the Great Ficus Trees v. S.C.,
No. S202955, (Cal. Super. Ct. Cnty. of L.A. Filed June 1, 2012).
152. Charmont Partners v. City of Santa Monica, (Dist. Ct. Cnty. of L.A.
Filed Jan. 26, 2012).
153. Bowman, v. City of Berkeley, 122 Cal. App. 4th 572 (2004); Brief for
Appellant, Ad-Hoc Committee v. County of Placer, Cal. App. 3 Dist. (2013)
WL 2112039; Dessins v. City of Sacramento, (Cal. Super. Ct. Cnty of
Sacramento. Filed, Feb. 6, 2014); Stephen Wollmer v. City of Berkeley, (Cal.
Super. Ct. Cnty. of Alameda. Filed Apr 1, 2010); Save Tara v. City of West
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too many Californians, are more important than the special interest
campaign contributor defenders of the status quo.
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